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ABSTRACT
The recent Defense Mobility Requirements Study
determined there is an urgent need for Ready Reserve Force
(RRF) ships to meet the sealift follow-on surge
requirements. There are three alternatives for acquiring
these ships: purchase and convert older commercial ships
(inactive RRF), build militarily useful, yet commercially
viable ships and lease them to the commercial shipping
industry (active RRF) , or subsidize the construction of
commercial ships with National Defense Features. This
thesis conducted a financial analysis of these three
alternatives to determine which is the most cost effective.
The results of this analysis show that each alternative is a
cost effective approach to acquiring ships under different
values for the most critical factors: acquisition costs,
lease rate and discount rate. Even so, with the current
political and economic environment, and the current military
'budget crisis' the inactive RRF presents the only viable
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The dramatic decline in the United States maritime
industry over the past thirty years has presented a serious
problem for the nation's military sealift capability.
Throughout the history of the United States, the military
has relied on the nation's commercial shipping industry to
transport military equipment and personnel wherever needed.
At the end of Operation Desert Shield/Storm the need for a
larger, more responsive military sealift capability was
clear. As the U.S. military continues to change in future
years (i.e., smaller base forces, less forward deployment
and less overseas basing) and the U.S. maritime industry
continues its decline, this need will only intensify.
In response to Congressional requests, the Department of
Defense is conducting the Defense Mobility Requirements
Study (MRS) . One emphasis of this study is to assess the
need for additional sealift ships, in light of the recent
experience in Operation Desert Shield/Storm. The first part
of the MRS, which was recently released, dealt with the
topic of surge shipping requirements. The MRS concluded
that acquiring additional Roll-on/Roll-of f (RO/RO) vessels
was of the utmost importance to help make-up the shortfall
in surge shipping. Due to its military usefulness, this
type of vessel proved to be very important during Operation
Desert Shield/Storm.
In conjunction with the MRS, the Navy has conducted an
analysis, entitled "Strategic Sealift Implementation Plan"
(dated 21 September, 1992), to determine the best method of
acquiring the ships needed to meet the MRS requirements.
From this analysis, two different prospective ship designs
have emerged: a large (950 feet), 24 knot RO/RO to be used
for prepositioning and surge sealift shipping, and a medium
(700 feet) 20 knot potentially commercially viable RO/RO to
be used in meeting the additional follow-on surge
requirements identified in the MRS. In June of 1992, the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved the
initial design of the large 24 knot RO/RO vessel, but
deferred a decision on the medium sized, 20 knot RO/RO
vessel pending further analysis of its commercial viability
and military utility.
Under the current analysis structure, there are
essentially three different alternatives the Navy can take
in acquiring the additional sealift ships needed to meet the
shortfall in follow-on surge capability:
• Purchase older obsolete ships from the commercial
shipping industry, convert the ships to enhance their
military capabilities, and then lay-up these ships in the
Ready Reserve Force (RRF)
. This alternative is presently
used.
• Build militarily useful, yet commercially viable ships
in U.S. shipyards and then lease these ships to the U.S.
commercial shipping industry. These ships would be
government owned.
• Have commercial shipping companies construct merchant
ships in U.S. shipyards, with the necessary military
enhancements (known as National Defense Features). This
ship construction would be subsidized by the government
through sealift ship construction funds. These ships would
be under private ownership and recalled in time of a
national emergency or contingency.
B. OBJECTIVES
This thesis is a financial analysis of these three
alternatives. Each alternative will be considered based
upon both its cost to the government and its present and
future enhancement of the nation's sealift capability.
Factors that enhance the U.S. maritime industry will also be
considered.
The first part of the analysis will look at past and
present costs for maintaining and operating the RRF. This
analysis will assess the current readiness and capabilities
of the RRF with an emphasis on Operation Desert Shi eld/ Storm
results
.
Secondly, the three alternatives will be financially
analyzed. The structure of the analysis will be based upon
the net present value model for capital budgeting decisions
and the DOD instruction for Economic Analysis and Program
Evaluation for Resource Management (DODD 7041.3).
Specifically, uniform annual costs will be calculated for
each alternative. Data concerning ship acquisition and
conversion costs, maintenance costs, potential leasing
income and other auxiliary costs will be provided to
estimate the overall financial costs or savings to the
government for each alternative. The assumptions concerning
the above mentioned costs, revenues and ship useful life for
each alternative will be discussed.
Lastly, the results of the financial analysis for each
alternative will be compared to determine the most cost
effective method for ship acquisition. This comparison will
deal with the strong and weak points of each alternative,
particularly concerning cost effectiveness versus
operational readiness and availability. Non-financial
considerations and their effect on future decisions will
also be discussed.
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This thesis will help determine which of the three
alternatives is the most cost effective method for meeting
present and future sealift requirements. This study will
analyze the overall cost of each alternative, and summarize
their benefits and drawbacks. The thesis will also address
present and future non-financial issues concerning these
alternatives
.
This thesis will not address logistics requirements for
sealift. This has been established in prior analyses,
including the MRS and Strategic Sealift Implementation Plan.
D. ORGANIZATION
The following is an overview of the chapters in this
thesis
:
• Chapter II will describe the different components of
military sealift, including the National Defense Reserve
Fleet and the Ready Reserve Force.
• Chapter III will discuss the RRF performance in
Operation Desert Shield/Storm, emphasizing lessons learned.
• Chapter IV will present an overview of the recent
Strategic Sealift Implementation Plan, including a
discussion of the progress in the current strategic sealift
ship acquisition program.
• Chapter V will provide an overview of the financial
analysis of an active RRF program conducted in the Strategic
Sealift Implementation Plan. This analysis is considered
further by developing a uniform annual cost analysis of the
three alternatives (i.e., inactive RRF, active RRF and NDF)
.
The uniform annual cost analysis is the emphasis of the
thesis. The methods, models and assumptions contained in
the uniform annual cost analysis will be described in
detail. This chapter will conclude with a summary of the
results
.
• Chapter VI discusses the strengths and weaknesses of
each alternative, including additional non-financial
considerations. This chapter provides a summary of the
overall conclusions of the thesis.
II. MILITARY SEALIFT OVERVIEW
A. INTRODUCTION
In the event of a national emergency or contingency, the
U.S. armed forces must quickly move large amounts of
military equipment, supplies and personnel to anywhere in
the world. Strategic mobility is the transportation of
equipment required for deployment, initial support and
sustainment of U.S. armed forces overseas. The three
elements of strategic mobility are sealift, airlift and
prepositioning [Ref. 1: p. 14]. In any contingency or
national emergency, prepositioning and sealift will be
required to transport the bulk of military equipment and
supplies. Throughout the latter 1970 ' s and 1980' s the
Department of Defense (DOD) emphasized enhancing the
nation's sealift position. The ability to quickly deliver
military cargo overseas during a national emergency or
contingency is of the utmost concern to logistics planners.
This chapter provides a detailed discussion of strategic
sealift. The first section presents definitions of the
three basic categories of sealift shipping: prepositioning,
surge and sustainment. The second section discusses the
different components that make up strategic sealift. The
third section discusses the history and purpose of the
National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) , specifically the
7
Ready Reserve Force. This is followed by a discussion of
the specific maintenance and operations of the NDRF,




There are three categories of sealift shipping:
prepositioning, surge and sustainment. Prepositioning means
that ships are loaded with the necessary military cargo and
staged in advance in areas where they will most likely be
needed.
Sealift surge requirements are for military unit
equipment (UE) . This consists of large cargo such as
vehicles, tanks, artillery, etc., which are not readily
containerized for transport. Surge and follow-on surge
involve the bulk of UE used to supply and reinforce any area
of overseas operations. Roll-on/Roll-of f (RO/RO) ships are
best suited for this task. [Ref. 2: p. 10]
Sustainment consists' of spares, food and other bulk
supplies which can be placed in containers for shipping.
This cargo is vital for long term military operations.
In a contingency, such as Operation Desert Shield/Storm,
prepositioned ships are the first to arrive in the area.
They are followed by the first wave of surge ships carrying
essential military hardware and supplies. After the initial
surge ships, follow-on surge ships will start to arrive
bringing additional equipment and supplies. Once all
necessary equipment has been transported, sustainment cargo
arrives. The bulk of sustainment cargo for the deployed
forces is provided by shipping from all sources, but mainly
U.S. and foreign commercial merchant ships and the re-use of
Afloat Prepositioning Force ships (explained in the next
section) . This shipping is needed to replace daily
consumption items and increase in-theater reserves to 60 day
levels or more.
C. STRATEGIC SEALIFT
Strategic sealift consists of several components. The
following discusses these components:
1. Afloat Prepositioning Force
The Afloat Prepositioning Force (APF) is comprised of
the following:
a. Afloat Prepositioning Ships (APS)
These ships are used for non-combat stores and
supplies. APS consists of four tankers and seven general
cargo ships which carry supplies for the Air Force and Army,
and one cargo ship for a Naval Fleet Hospital. These ships
are managed by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) . They are
fully manned and chartered on a three year lease funded by
the Army. -These ships are prepositioned at Diego Garcia in
the Indian Ocean. They are commonly referred to as PREPO
ships
.
b. Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS)
There are 13 MPS ships organized into three
squadrons: five ships at Diego Garcia, four ships in the
Western Atlantic and four ships at Guam. Each squadron
carries the necessary equipment and supplies for a 16,500
member Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) . The squadrons
are outfitted with enough supplies for 30 days.
The 13 MPS ships were commercially built using
guaranteed government loans and guaranteed contracts. The
commercial company is given complete ownership of the ship
after 25 years. Additionally, these vessels are manned by
civilian crews and have military detachments assigned on
board.
2. Fast Sealift Ships (FSS)
This component consists of eight fast SL7 container
ships that were purchased and converted to a modified RO/RO
configuration at a cost of approximately $827 million.
[Ref. 3: p. 14] These ships are used for transporting Army
UE. They are maintained in a reduced operating status
(ROS) . The ships are manned with a reduced crew (10-12
members) and the steam plant is maintained in a 'hot'
condition. This ensures that the ships can be activated
within four days to help meet initial surge requirements.
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3. Follow-on Surge Shipping
There are three sources for follow-on surge
shipping. They consist of the following:
a. Ready Reserve Force (RRF)
As of August 1990, there were 96 ships in the
RRF with a projected increase to 142 ships by 1994. This
will include (estimated) 60 dry cargo ships, 32 RO/ROs, 12
auxiliary crane ships, 36 tankers, and 2 troopships. The
ships in the RRF are acquired by purchasing obsolete, yet
militarily useful, commercial ships, upgrading selected
ships from the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) and
transferring previous Navy support vessels. These ships are
used to transport Army and Marine Corps resupply equipment.
b. U.S. Flag Fleet
Ships operating under U.S. registry (U.S. flag)
can be requisitioned by the President of the United States
in a national emergency. In addition, ship owners/operators
who receive Operational Differential Subsidies (ODS) 1 , or
Construction Differential Subsidies (CDS) must participate
in the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) (see Appendix C for a
discussion of CDS) . This program requires that the ship
owner/operator provide 50 percent of their fleet for use in
^Operating Differential Subsidies provide the operator of U.S. flag vessels employed in U.S. foreign trade
with additional funds to cover the differential costs of operating a ship under U.S. registry as compared to
current foreign ship operators. The subsidy is designed to cover any excess amounts incurred for crew
wages, insurance, operations and maintenance. This subsidy is designed to help the ship operator
compete on a cost competitive basis with foreign ship operators.
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a national emergency or contingency. For each participating
ship owner, those ships that are part of the SRP program can
be requisitioned by the government within the following time
periods: 20 percent within 10 days, 30 percent within 30
days and 50 percent within 60 days. This requisition
requirement has never been tested under real world
conditions. The number of militarily useful commercial
merchant ships in the U.S. flag fleet is declining and
therefore represents a decline in follow-on surge capability
for the U.S. military. [Ref. 2: pp. 13-14]
c. Effective U.S. Controlled Fleet (EUSC)
There are many U.S. merchant ships registered
under flags of convenience (i.e., Liberia, Honduras, Panama,
etc.). Certain foreign governments allow ship owners to
register ships under their national flag. This allows these
ship owners to circumvent shipping regulations and policies
in the U.S. The ship owners gain financial benefits from
doing so. Additionally, these foreign nations allow U.S.
ship owners to support U.S. military needs when necessary.
EUSC ships can also be requisitioned by Presidential
authority if deemed necessary. [Ref. 2: p. 14]
Finally, additional ships can be provided by the
non-RRF component of the NDRF. This fleet is made up of
older merchant vessels that have been acquired by the
12
Maritime Administration (MARAD) and placed in lay-up. These
ship are mainly used to provide sustainment shipping.
The NDRF is explained in more detail in the next
section. This discussion will include a brief history of
the NDRF. Following this, the RRF is discussed in detail,
addressing ship lay-up, readiness, management, maintenance,
outporting and activations.
D. NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET
1. History of the National Defense Reserve Fleet
Shortly after World War II, the NDRF was established
under MARAD through Section 11 of the Merchant Ship Sales
Act of 1946. The NDRF was established in order to lay-up
the large number of merchant vessels that were built during
World War II, but were no longer needed for commercial use.
At its inception, the NDRF consisted of over 2000 vessels.
Over the years the number of ships has fallen. The current
fleet size is about 330 vessels.
These ships are maintained at three primary
anchorages: James River, VA. ; Beaumont, Neches River, TX;
and Suisan Bay, CA. Several ships are also based at various
locations throughout the United States (outported)
.
MARAD categorizes ships in the NDRF as either "active
or "inactive". The active fleet is those ships maintained
for future mobilization during contingencies or national
emergencies. The inactive fleet is those ships awaiting
13
sale or scrapping. The major portion of the active fleet
falls into two categories: the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and
the non-RRF.
• The Ready Reserve Force was initiated in 1976. The
program was undertaken in response to the dramatic decline
in the U.S. flag merchant fleet. Evolution in the U.S.
merchant fleet towards fewer, larger ships,
containerization and smaller crews has lead to today's
smaller U.S. maritime industry. Government and military
officials believed that the size of the U.S. merchant fleet
was no longer adequate to support U.S. military sealift
demands. Additionally, the aging ships in the NDRF can not
meet the sealift mobility requirements for the military.
The RRF was established to maintain ships in the NDRF at a
higher level of readiness in order to meet initial and
follow-on surge requirements during any contingency or
national emergency.
The RRF is a joint Navy and MARAD program. The Navy
provides MARAD guidance concerning RRF composition,
outporting requirements and ship types needed. MARAD then
executes the Navy guidance. [Ref. 1: p. 26]
• As of December 31, 1990, the non-RRF included 116
vessels. Seventy-one of the breakbulk ships in the non-RRF
are Victory ships which were built towards the end of World
War II. The other 45 vessels consist of breakbulk,
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container, auxiliary crane (TACS) , heavy lift, aviation
support (TAVB), product tankers, and troopships (see
Appendix A for definitions and purpose of each type of
vessel) .
It is estimated that these ships could be activated in
one to six months, depending upon the ship's age and
condition. The cost of maintaining ships in a non-RRF
status is low relative to other programs. A current GAO
study determined that many of the non-RRF ships in the NDRF
were no longer adequate to meet current sealift needs,
including the older Victory class breakbulk ships. Due to
their age and poor condition, these ships could not be
realistically activated in a useful time frame for a
national emergency or contingency. As older ships are
phased out they provide some scrapping income to fund the
on-going operations of the active RRF.
DOD and MARAD continue to justify the non-RRF fleet by
stressing it is needed to help make up for shortfalls in
present military sealift capacity (mainly in the area of
sustainment) . They are expected to fill in shipping gaps
that may develop as shipping losses occur during a future
prolonged global war. [Ref. 3: p. 10] There is a general
consensus that the older vessels of the non-RRF will be
scrapped, but there is no agreement concerning the time
frame. [Ref. 3]
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2 . Maintenance and Operation
a . Ship Lay-up
The purpose of laying up, or preserving a ship is
to keep the ship's condition from deteriorating too rapidly.
When a ship is procured for the non-RRF, or the RRF, it is
inspected. All ships must meet American Bureau of Shipping
(ABS) and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) standards and qualify as a
"Class I" vessel. Then the ship is thoroughly cleaned. All
systems are drained and equipment in the engineering spaces
uncovered. The ship compartments are then sealed and
vacuumed tested. Dehumidifier equipment is installed with
hook ups to the engineering spaces, and other major
compartments. Fans in the spaces circulate the dehumidified
air. This process is used to help keep the equipment in a
laid-up condition and minimize corrosion. Additionally, a
cathodic protection system is installed to limit corrosion
of the ship's hull. Each ship is inspected by MARAD
personnel on a routine basis. [Ref. 4]
Jb. RRF Readiness
Readiness can be defined as the amount of time
before a particular ship will be available for loading after
leaving a laid-up condition. [Ref. 5: p. 5] Each RRF
vessel is assigned a readiness condition (R-status) of 5, 10
and 20 days (R-5, R-10, R-20) . The R-status is based upon
the logistics support requirements set by DOD. MARAD is
16
required to maintain each ship in such a condition that it
is able to meet the required R-status time period. The R-
status is provided by MSC and assigned to each RRF ship.
The R-status, however, does not reflect the actual
material condition of the ship. To assess the material
condition of each ship, MARAD assigns a C-status. This is a
technical ranking and reflects the ship's ability to meet
the R-status time requirement. The following is a listing
of the C-status categories:
• C-l- No mission degrading deficiencies.
• C-2- Documented mission degrading deficiencies which
can be corrected within the readiness period.
• C-3- Deficiencies which cannot be corrected within
the assigned readiness period.
• C-4- Major deficiencies which prevent the ship from
performing its mission and cannot be corrected within
the assigned readiness period.
• C-5- Ship has scheduled major repairs and is unable
to meet its assigned readiness criteria.
[Ref. 6: pp. 2-4]
c. RRF Management »
Ships in the RRF are maintained and operated by
MARAD through contracts with commercial companies. These
contractors are known as Ship Managers. The duties of the
Ship Manager are extensive. A partial list of major duties
is as follows:
• Hire (subject to the Navy's approval) the ship's
Master.
17
• Equip, supply and repair the vessel as necessary.
• When necessary, hire the required crew, both licensed
and unlicensed.
• Hire tugboats and pilots and pay the necessary canal
and other fees.
• Make the necessary ship voyage and port arrangements.
[Ref. 1: pp. 45-46]
d. PRF Maintenance
Once the RRF ship is laid-up, basic maintenance and
testing is performed on each ship on a routine basis. This
is known as Phase IV maintenance. For ships maintained at
the three NDRF sites, maintenance is divided into sections
and performed on a monthly basis. For outported ships,
maintenance is done once a year (in a 10 to 12 day period)
.
Major repairs are contracted out to a commercial
shipyard. [Ref . 4]
RRF maintenance has suffered in recent years.
Phase IV maintenance does not provide for the maintenance
required to keep RRF ships in the necessary readiness
status. Due to budget constraints, a large part the needed
repairs to many RRF vessels has been delayed in past years.
[Ref. 6] [Ref. 11]
Phase IV maintenance represents a major portion of
the costs necessary for RRF upkeep. Table 1 lists the
average annual costs by ship class. Additionally, the
required ABS follow-on inspections are approximately
$382,000 per year, per ship [Ref. 5: p. 13].
TABLE 1
PHASE IV MAINTENANCE COSTS










Due to the increasing number of RRF ships, the
outporting program was initiated in 1986. The three
established NDRF sites were unable to activate the increased
number of ships so additional locations were selected. Now
certain R-5 readiness ships are berthed near prospective
military load out locations. This action hopefully reduces
shipyard and port congestion during contingency activations.
Outporting ships also helps decrease activation and load out
times. [Ref. 1: p. 58] Funding for the outporting program
comes under the maintenance and operation category of
MARAD's RRF program budget. Under the FY 88 to 92 planning
guidance, it is projected that the annual costs for RRF ship
outporting totals $10 million [Ref. 1: p. 64]. The exact
individual operating costs for each ship will vary,
depending upon the location and type of ship. Under the
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outporting budget plan the main items are for service
contracts and supply materials. [Ref. 8]
f. RRF Activations
All, or a large part, of the RRF will be activated
during any long term contingency. Most of the burden will
be placed on MARAD, Ship Managers and shipyards to activate
these ships in a timely manner. In order to prepare for
activation, MARAD activates a chosen number of RRF ships
each year. Each activation involves a single ship. During
an actual contingency, several ships under the control of
each region will be activated in a short time period.
There are two types of activations: no-notice and
service activations. During no-notice activations, ships
are activated with no prior notice. This activation best
simulates the actual RRF ship mobilization required during a
national emergency or contingency.
Conversely, service activations are conducted with
prior notice. These are routinely performed in conjunction
with an exercise. Military users identify a particular ship
and the ship is then activated. Service activations, in
general, are less expensive than no notice activations
because the prior planning avoids excessive labor premiums
(refer to Table 3). [Ref. 5: p. 5]
The goal of the Navy and MARAD has been to activate
each ship once every five years. This coincides with the
20
five year dry-docking required for ABS re-certification
[Ref. 5: p. 1] . Due to budget constraints and reduced
funding, actual activations have been limited and fall short
of this goal. The activation process consists of the
following:





24 hour sea trial (unless the activation is for a
particular mission)
.
Post repairs, including dry-docking if necessary.
Deactivation and lay-up.
In order for a ship to meet its readiness
requirements, the ship must be in the proper material
condition. During activations, all identified problems are
repaired prior to the ship deactivation and lay-up. Thus,
the material condition of the ship is greatly improved.
This helps to ensure that the ship can meet its R-status
activation requirement. [Ref. 5] [Ref. 6] [Ref. 9]
One might make the assumption that if one or two
ships are successfully activated, then other ships of the
same type can also be activated under the same time
requirements. This is not true. Past activations have
limited value in predicting present and future RRF
readiness. A disproportionate number of ships activated in
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the past have recently been included in the RRF. Therefore,
they are in better material condition than the average RRF
ship. Almost all activations have been performed on ships
with less than four years in the RRF [Ref . 5: p. 7] . Since
it is likely that a significant number of RRF ships will be
required simultaneously, a greater cross-section of RRF
ships should be activated to better measure readiness [Ref.
5: pp. 6-7]. As of 1990, approximately 75 percent of the
RRF had never been activated. This has led many individuals
to question the RRF's actual readiness [Ref. 7: p. 14].
Activation is the only way to test an RRF ship
operationally. The routine Phase IV maintenance and other
inspections do not test the ship's systems under operating
conditions. A large part of the problem for RRF ships is
that systems are not actually tested during the lay-up and
most major repair items found during routine maintenance and
inspections are delayed until some future time. The lack of
adequate system maintenance and testing during lay-up led to
most of the problems for the RRF ships during the Operation
Desert Shield/Storm activations. [Ref. 4] [Ref. 6] [Ref. 11]
In dollar terms, it costs approximately $1.5
million per ship, per activation. This figure varies
depending upon the ship type (diesel, steam, gas turbine) ,
ship age, time in the RRF and material condition. Table 2
gives a maximum and minimum value for each ship type in the
22
RRF. The $ 1.5 million comes from averaging the maximum and
minimum for the C-3 and C-4 ships [Ref. 5: p. 11]. This is
the estimate often used by MARAD.
The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) developed the
following conclusions concerning RRF activation costs:
• In general, older ships tend to be more expensive to
activate than newer ones.
• Steamships tend to be more expensive to activate than
diesel ships.
• Ships that have received more maintenance during lay-
up periods are less expensive to activate than those ships
which have received less maintenance.
• The most significant variable affecting activation
costs is the amount of time the ship has been in lay-up,
especially if the ship has not been activated in recent
years. On average, each additional year of lay-up adds
approximately $200,000 in shipyard repairs during the next
activation. The analysis demonstrates that shipyard repair
costs increase greatly as a function of time in lay-up,
though there are some limitations to the regression analysis
conducted. [Ref. 5: p. 13, App G]
CNA also lists the average costs for activations by
ship type, based on FY 1985 to FY 1987 activations data for
18 ships in the RRF. The average costs for the nine no-
notice activations was $915,000; it was $654,000 for the
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nine service activations. The problem with these cost
estimates is that they exclude certain shipyard expenses,
such as labor, dry-docking and materials used during the
activation/deactivation process. Additionally, these
activations were mainly of the newer RO/ROs. Activation of
an older ship will be more expensive. [Ref. 5: p. 12]
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*Average numbers used for the $1.5 million cost
per activation.
As an interesting note, the cost of activation and
deactivation for RRF ships used during Operation Desert
Shield/Storm should be higher than normal because of longer
ship steaming and operating times and the increased need for
repairs prior to deactivation and lay-up. Currently, this
is the case with ships that are going through the
deactivation process for lay-up. Conversely, these ships
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will be in much better material condition in the coming
years. This will enhance present and future RRF capability.
TABLE 3
COMPONENTS OF ACTIVATION COSTS
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The RRF is one component in the strategic sealift
structure. Its main purpose is to provide follow-on surge
shipping during a national emergency or contingency. All
facets of RRF maintenance and operations were incorporated
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to help maintain these ships in the proper readiness
condition. Maintaining the RRF ships in the proper
readiness condition is of the utmost importance to help
insure that these ships will meet the required activation
time schedule when needed. Past experience has demonstrated
that RRF maintenance and upkeep is lacking. This has strong
implications for the RRF's ability to meet strategic sealift
requirements in the future.
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III. THE RRF IN OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM
A. BACKGROUND
The unique circumstances of Operation Desert
Shield/ Storm made up for some of the shortfalls in the U.S.
strategic sealift program. International support and the
formation of the coalition helped to ensure that foreign
shipping was available to make up for shortfalls in the
available sealift assets. Host nation support (Saudi
Arabia) was extensive. They provided large amounts of fuel
and supplies which otherwise would have been shipped to the
area. This reduced the sealift requirements. The ports in
the area were modern and well equipped, providing easy
access for all types of ships and easy discharge of
equipment and supplies. The initial months, with the Iraqi
forces taking a defensive stance, somewhat reduced the
urgency of the military build-up. Even so, the overall
delivery of combat and support forces lagged the in-theater
commanders' expectations during this period. [Ref. 10:p. 1]
This chapter presents a discussion on RRF performance in
Operation Desert Shield/Storm. The emphasis of this
discussion is to understand current RRF capabilities and
limitations. The first section presents an overview of RRF
activations during the contingency. The second section
discusses the performance of the RRF during these
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activations. Lastly, the conclusions that can be drawn from
RRF performance are presented. This section stresses major
problems that were encountered during these activations and
their main causes.
B. OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM RRF ACTIVATIONS
1 . Overview
The deployment of military equipment, supplies and
personnel in Operation Desert Shield/Storm was divided into
two phases. Phase I, which began on August 7 1990 (C-day)
and continued until November 15, 1990 (C+100) . Phase II
began on 4 December 1990 and continued until 5 February
1991. On August 9 1990, one week after Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait, the decision was made to use the RRF to support the
surge deployment of U.S. armed forces. After the Secretary
of the Navy's authorization on 10 August, MARAD activated 17
RO/ROs from the RRF. Additional activations soon followed.
By 31 August, a total of 41 RRF ships had been activated.
Of these 41 ships, five (12 percent) were on time, 17 (41
percent) were one to five days late, six (15 percent) were
six to ten days late, and four (10 percent) were 10 to 20
days late. The remaining nine ships were still completing
activation. The average time to activate RRF ships in
breakout yards was nine days. [Ref. 7: p. 16]
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By the end of Phase I, a total of 44 RRF ships had
been activated. This included 17 RO/ROs, three barge
carriers and 24 breakbulk ships. Overall, only 12 (27
percent) were on time and 20 (45 percent) were activated
more than five days later than their R-status. [Ref. 12: p.
7] [Ref. 11: p. 6-4]
During Phase II, an additional 27 ships were activated
bringing the total to 71 ships. At this point, 20 ships (28
percent) were on time, 41 ships (58 percent) were late,
seven (10 percent) were returned, two ships (3 percent) were
returned and redelivered, and one ship (one percent) was
canceled. [Ref. 7: p. 16]
2 . Performance
Operation Desert Shield/Storm was the first large
scale RRF activation. Thus, it provided a good measure of
the RRF's capabilities, particularly concerning maintenance,
operations and manning. Table 5 provides an overall profile
of the C-status for the 71 ships that were activated.
Additionally, Table 6 gives a detailed RRF activation
summary for the 71 ships based on ship R-status. :
2A total of 78 ships were activated in conjunction with Operation Desert Shield/Storm Some ships were
used for combat logistics support, others were activated and then deactivated, and two breakbulk ships
were activated and maintained in an ROS condition until deactivated. The 71 ships listed in the above




Type of Ship C-l C-2 C-3 C-4 C-5 Total
Breakbulk 8 26 7 41
TACS 2 1 3
Heavy Lift 15 1 7
RO/RO 9 3 2 3 17
Tanker 12 3
Total "75 44 3 2 12 1\
[Ref. 11: pp. 6-3,5]
TABLE 6
R-STATUS
Time Period R-5 R-10 R-20 Total
Early or on time 11 5 2 18
1-5 days late 16 3 19
6-20 days late 19 2 21
>20 days late 9 4 13
Total ~~55 14 2 1\
[Ref. 11: pp. 6-4,5]
Table 5 shows that 78 percent (54 of 71) of the ships
activated were in either C-l or C-2 status. However, Table
6 shows that only 25 percent (18 of 71) of all ships were
early or on time. Specifically, 51 percent of the R-5 ships
were greater than five days late, and 43 percent of the R-10
ships were greater than five days late. Thus, there appears
to be no direct correlation between the C-status and R-
status for RRF ships.
At the time of Operation Desert Shield/Storm, 69
percent of the ships in the RRF were in an R-5 status. This
resulted from the Navy's previous policy of assigning newly
acquired RRF ships to the R-5 status. This policy has been
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discontinued. With the current RRF budget levels, MARAD can
only support 40 R-5 ships. [Ref. 11: p. 6-6,7]
During the operation, more ships were needed than
activated from the RRF. In total, 212 ships were chartered
by MSC for use during the conflict. Of these, 180 ships
were foreign and 32 U.S. owned. [Ref. 3: p. 16] To rely
on such a large number of foreign ships to support U.S.
armed forces in future years can be dangerous. They may not
be available in a different situation.
One must question why the remaining ships in the RRF
were not activated. The most plausible answers are that
they could not be made ready in time and their military
utility was questionable [Ref. 10: p. 34]. To maintain
these ships and yet not use them when needed is a waste of
precious money.
Additionally, there were no U.S. flag merchant ships
requisitioned under the SRP program. Because these ships
operate in U.S. foreign trade routes, their requisition
posed a problem. If these ships were requisitioned, they
would be diverted from their commercial business during the
contingency. The trade provided by these ships would likely
be filled by foreign shipping. This could have created
strong economic and political backlash.
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3. Conclusions from Performance Results
a. Maintenance and Upkeep
The main reason for the poor results with RRF
activations is maintenance and upkeep. George G. Sharpe,
Inc., conducted a study of the first 45 ships activated from
the RRF during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. The study
concluded that the poor material condition of the RRF was
the primary cause for the delay in ship activations. This
has been further reinforced by more recent studies. The
Operation Desert Shield/Storm experience with RRF
activations shows that the RRF must have more realistic
goals concerning material condition and readiness in order
to better reflect current capabilities. [Ref. 7] [Ref. 6]
[Ref. 11]
Over the past several years, RRF funding shortfalls
have limited maintenance and upkeep. To ensure that RRF
ships are maintained in the proper condition for a future
contingency, regular activations must be conducted. Post
analysis of RRF ship activations in Operation Desert
Shield/Storm demonstrated that those vessels which were
previously activated were better able to meet their R-status
date than those that had not been activated. For example,
for the 17 RO/ROs activated in Phase I, those that had been
previously activated were an average 2.4 days late. Those
ships not previously activated were an average 13.6 days
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late. [Ref. 11: p. 6-6] Without a greater improvement in
maintenance and readiness, most RRF ships cannot be
activated within the five day requirement.
Outporting R-5 ships is also important. Under
ideal conditions, a ship that is moored at one of the three
NDRF sites will require one day to breakout from the mooring
and tow to the shipyard. Then it will require a minimum of
24 hours to conduct sea trials. This leaves only three days
in the shipyard to activate the ship. If other ships are
also being activated at the same shipyard (s), there will be
further delays. During Operation Desert Shield/Storm, 79
percent (11 of 14) R-5 ships that were activated from NDRF
sites exceeded the 5-day limit by an average of 10.1 days.
[Ref. 11: pp. 6-7,8]
Jb. Ship Managers
There have been numerous problems with the Ship
Managers. Prior to 1986, Ship Managers worked on a
reimbursable basis for all costs (General Agency
agreements). After that, low bid Ship Manager contracts
were established. In these contracts the Ship Managers must
bid for general (overhead) contracts. Only repairs are
reimbursable. This has caused problems. Ship Managers will
cut costs wherever possible. For example, there are no full
time port engineers to help maintain the RRF ships in their
proper material status. Overall, this has caused activation
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delays because often there was not enough manpower and
support from the Ship Managers to help activate the ship(s).
These delays were exacerbated during Operation Desert
Shield/Storm since several of the Ship Managers were not
prepared to activate so many ships in such a short period of
time. [Ref. 4] [Ref. 6] [Ref. 11]
c. Ship Manning
The 78 RRF ships activated during Operation Desert
Shield/Storm have an estimated 2500 licensed and unlicensed
billets. In general, manning problems did not cause delays
during the activations. However, there were two skill
groups in short supply: senior experienced engineers and
qualified radio officers. [Ref. 11: p. 6-11] The manning
problem had been of particular concern to M7ARAD prior to
Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Of particular interest for
this thesis are two possible solutions being examined by
MARAD and the Navy. They are stated briefly here:
( 1 ) Maintaining operating crews on ROS ships and
retention crews on R-5 ships. Presently, the eight Fast
Sealift Ships are maintained in an ROS status and have small
operating crews on board to help maintain the ships in good
operating condition. There are current plans to place
several of the RO/RO ships in the RRF into an ROS status to
maintain these ships in a higher readiness level.
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The problem for many of the RRF ships is that
the R-5 status does not allow sufficient time for manning
and training a crew unfamiliar with the engineering plant.
More importantly, it does not allow time for senior licensed
engineering personnel (Chief Engineer, First Assistant
Engineer) to become familiar with the details of the
engineering plant in order to ensure the ship operates
smoothly. Placing retention crews on several R-5 ships
could alleviate this problem by providing a source of
experienced engineers and maintaining the ship in good
operating condition. The retention crews could provide
services for a single or several "nested" ships at outported
locations. [Ref. 11: pp. 6-11,12]
(2) Establish a Civilian Merchant Marine Personnel
Reserve. This would provide for the continued training of
experienced personnel in the merchant marine industry in
order to crew vessels in the RRF in the event of large scale
activations. MARAD plans to begin implementing this program
in the FY 93 budget cycle. Funding would be provided
through RRF appropriations. The following are some
important aspects of this Reserve program:
• Each member would commit to a certain length of
service.
• They would receive two weeks paid training annually.
• Training would be conducted on RRF ships during
regular activations and sea trials.
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This type of training program would help ensure that
properly trained and experienced personnel are available to
meet large RRF activation demands in the future. [Ref. 11:
p. 6-13]
C. SUMMARY
Many problems were encountered during the RRF
activations for Operation Desert Shield/Storm. The major
reasons for the delays during these activations are
summarized as follows:
• Poor material condition of the propulsion and
auxiliary machinery.
• Difficulty in getting spare parts, especially for
foreign built ships.
• Difficulty in obtaining properly trained crews to
operate the older steam propulsion plants in the RRF.
• Poor Ship Manager performance.
• No outporting of many R-5 ships.
Conversely, the poor material condition of RRF ships,
limited shipyard capacity, limited available manning and
lack of sufficient U.S. flag merchant ships were the major
reasons the U.S. relied so heavily on foreign flag ship
charters in Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Due to the
unique circumstances of this contingency, including the
international support, an adequate supply of foreign ships
was available for military charter. It would not be prudent
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to assume that so many foreign ships would be available for
a future contingency under different circumstances.
It takes time and money to properly maintain and
activate RRF ships. With the 'budget crisis' in recent
years, the funding necessary for RRF ship maintenance has
not been available. As newer ships are acquired for the RRF
to meet the proposed goal of 142 ships by 1994 it will
become even harder to maintain ships in the proper material
and operational condition. Therefore, future RRF policy
must balance new ship acquisitions against maintaining the
existing RRF ships in the proper readiness condition.
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IV CURRENT SEALIFT ENHANCEMENT INITIATIVES
A. BACKGROUND
The need to make up for the shortfalls in U.S. military
sealift capability has been an issue for many years. The
rapidly dwindling U.S. flag fleet is the major source of the
problem. Efforts over the years to stem this decrease have
failed. The U.S. flag fleet is dying because it is not cost
competitive with the merchant fleets from other countries.
In most countries, merchant shipping is heavily
subsidized. In many cases the entire merchant fleet is
government owned and operated (national fleet) . Government
subsidies for the U.S. merchant marine industry have been
all but eliminated within the past 15 years. This
contributes to the decline in the U.S. maritime industry
(see Appendix B for further discussion on U.S. maritime
subsidies) . Strict safety regulations and high wages for
merchant industry workers greatly increase ship construction
and operation costs in the U.S.
The structure of the current sealift force has been
largely established by circumstances in the U.S. Maritime
industry. As uneconomical commercial ships are phased out,
MARAD often acquires and places them into the RRF. Over the
years, there has been a growing reliance on government owned
shipping to make up for shortfalls in sealift requirements.
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The trend is obvious: during the Korean War, U.S. government
owned shipping carried 15 percent of the military cargo;
during the Vietnam War, it carried 34 percent; in Operation
Desert Shield/Storm, U.S. flag vessels carried 63 percent of
the total cargo, with 44 percent carried by government owned
vessels and 19 percent by commercial U.S. flag vessels. The
most startling fact is that during Operation Desert
Shield/Storm the U.S. relied on foreign shipping for nearly
two-thirds of the sustainment cargo. This trend will only
worsen in future years as the size of the U.S. flag fleet
continues to diminish. [Ref. 7: p. 17] [Ref. 10]
The shrinking U.S. merchant industry has also created a
more dramatic problem: a decline in the size and change in
the composition of the merchant marine seafaring work force.
In 1981, there were 51,000 seafaring personnel; in 1986 this
number was down to 30,000; in 1992 it is estimated between
21,000 and 22,000. [Ref. 14: p. 9] Due to the limited
number of jobs available for entry level individuals, the
median age in the industry has increased to approximately 55
years. [Ref. 14: p. 11] [Ref. 13: p. 55]
With the increasing size of the RRF, and the decreasing
number of U.S. flag vessels the manning problem is going to
deteriorate. A key ratio often used by industry experts is
the number of operating commercial ships necessary to man an
RRF ship. As the RRF ships get older and the commercial
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ships become larger and more automated, this ratio will
increase. It is currently estimated at 3.5:1. In other
words, 3.5 operating commercial ships are necessary to
provide enough manpower to effectively crew one RRF vessel.
By the mid-1990s this ratio is expected to reach 7:1. [Ref.
13: p. 14]
To successfully overcome these obstacles, an RRF program
must support the following areas:
• Provide the ships necessary to support the military's
logistics requirements.
• Maintain those ships in sufficient readiness so that
they can be quickly activated and reliably operate during a
national emergency or contingency.
• Provide the experienced manpower necessary to operate
the ships.
• Maintain some minimum level of shipyard capability so
that the required RRF ships can be activated without undo
shipyard capacity delays.
According to the lessons learned from Operation Desert
Shield/Storm, there were many problems in each of these
areas. If the past predicts the future, these problems will
get worse if action is not taken. This chapter reviews some
initiatives directed toward these problems.
B. STRATEGIC SEALIFT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
In the beginning of FY 1991, Congress directed the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to conduct the Defense Mobility Requirements
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Study (MRS) . This study estimated the requirements for
delivering military unit equipment, including surge and
follow-on surge. The study found that there was an urgent
need for surge shipping. The MRS concluded that additional
RO/RO vessels were needed to make up for this shortfall.
The FY 1991 National Defense Authorization Act directed the
Secretary of the Navy to provide an implementation plan for
the FY 90/91 funds authorized and appropriated for sealift.
The Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY 1991
directed the Navy to provide an acquisition plan for these
new RO/RO ships. Additionally, the Navy was tasked to work
with MARAD to consider acquiring commercially viable sealift
ships to meet follow-on surge requirements. [Ref. 17: p. 2]
In February, 1991, the CNO directed the Naval Sea
Systems Command (NAVSEA) to begin studying the feasibility
of different design concepts for military RO/RO ships. On
August 30, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) conducted a
Milestone review of the Strategic Sealift program. The
DAB authorized the Navy to proceed with Phase studies for
the initial RO/RO ship designs. The Navy also analyzed
different alternatives for acquiring the necessary ships.
These alternatives were presented in the Strategic Sealift
Implementation Plan. This initial analysis was forwarded to
Congress on 4 October, 1991.
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NAVSEA then awarded initial design contracts. Nine
shipyards submitted designs for a large (950 feet) 24 knot
RO/RO and a medium (700 feet) 24 knot RO/RO. The best
design concepts from each shipyard were combined to develop
the engineering features of each ship. As a result, a large
(950 feet) RO/RO has been designed to meet the military
requirements set forth in the MRS.
The medium (700 feet) RO/RO design has since developed
into a commercial ship possessing military utility. MARAD
oversees this development in conjunction with commercial
ship operators. Industry experts have reviewed the initial
ship designs and expressed some interest. The general
characteristics of this commercially viable ship were
presented to the Navy in a report dated 14 February 1992.
On 18 June 1992, the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC) approved the key characteristics of the large
24 knot RO/RO (LMSR) . However, the JROC deferred a decision
concerning the characteristics for a 20 knot commercially
viable RO/RO (COM-20) . The Navy has since tasked MARAD to
further study the COM-20 ship design in conjunction with
maritime industry experts. [Ref. 17: p. 3]
Currently, the Navy is in the engineering design phase
for the 24 knot LMSR. The COM-20 vessel is still being
considered for a build and charter concept. The MRS
provided a notional acquisition schedule to acquire nine 24
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knot LMSRs (300,000 square feet usable capacity) to meet the
2 million square feet prepositioning requirement by 1997.
The MRS also provided a notional acquisition schedule for
eleven 2 4 knot LMSRs (380,000 square feet usable capacity)
This would meet the 3 million surge sealift requirements.
The eleven new LMSRs will supplement the eight Fast Sealift
Ships in the existing sealift inventory. [Ref. 17: p. 12]
This thesis is particularly concerned with ships for
follow-on surge. There are presently three alternatives
being considered:
• Based on the initial shipyard designs, build a
commercially viable 20 knot ship (COM-20) with a 200,000 to
300,000 square foot capacity. These ships would be
acquired for a build and charter program. Based on the
follow-on surge requirements from the MRS, this will
require 11-15 newly constructed ships, depending upon the
final approved design. Converting existing commercial
RO/ROs is an option also under consideration for the build
and charter program. The Strategic Sealift Implementation
Plan refers to this program as the active RRF alternative.
[Ref. 17: p. 14]
• Acquire existing commercial RO/RO vessels, convert
them and then place them in the RRF. The MRS placing these
ships in an ROS status. An estimated 18 RO/ROs must be
purchased under this alternative to meet the follow-on
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surge requirements set forth in the MRS. This is referred
to as the inactive RRF alternative. [Ref. 17: p. 14]
• The final alternative designs National Defense
Features into new construction RO/ROs for commercial use.
Under this alternative, the U.S. government would pay for
military enhancements (National Defense Features) in new
construction vessels, or retrofit existing RO/ROs in order
to increase their military utility. In addition, the
government would reimburse the ship owner/operator for
additional operating costs associated with the NDFs, such
as increased fuel or maintenance costs. This would be
similar to both the Operational Differential Subsidy
program, used by the U.S. government to assist U.S. flag
vessel operators engaged in foreign trade, and the
Construction Differential Subsidy (see Appendix B for
further explanation) . The number of ships necessary to
meet the follow on surge requirements would depend upon the
size and age of the RO/RO vessels currently in the U.S.
flag fleet and the new construction vessels being
considered for this program. Based on current estimates,
15-18 commercial vessels would be required. This is
referred to as the NDF alternative.
Each of these alternatives has the potential to provide
the required follow-on surge capacity. To analyze each
alternative on an equal basis it is necessary to address
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specific areas of concern, such as current and future budget
requirements, the effect each alternative will have on the
commercial maritime industry and the urgency in meeting the
follow on surge shortfall. Each alternative includes
financial and non-financial considerations.
C. SUMMARY
Current sealift initiatives are addressing the need for
more surge shipping capacity. At present three alternatives
are being examined for acquiring RO/ROs for follow-on surge
shipping. These include the active RRF, inactive RRF and
NDF. The best alternative will provide the most cost
effective method for acquiring and maintaining sealift
assets and also provide much needed support for the U.S.
maritime industry.
45
V FINANCIAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
A. BACKGROUND
The present goal for strategic sealift is to satisfy
present and future requirements in a cost effective manner.
Meeting the needs of sealift within today's financial
constraints is not an easy task. The previous chapters
discussed three alternatives that address the follow-on
surge requirements established in the MRS. These are the
inactive RRF, active RRF and NDF alternatives.
When evaluating different investment alternatives it is
necessary to have a set of decision rules to determine the
preferred alternative. This chapter will discuss two
methods of evaluating these alternatives. First an overview
of the analysis conducted by N42 in the Strategic Sealift
Implementation Plan (SSIP) will be presented.
Secondly, the "uniform annual cost" analysis for the
three alternatives will be discussed. This analysis is the
emphasis of this thesis. The uniform annual cost analysis
is compared with the SSIP analysis. Then, specific
assumptions concerning each alternative, such as acquisition
costs, useful lives, ship size and maintenance and
operations costs will be addressed. The third part of this
section discusses the uniform annual cost analysis and the
conclusions that can be drawn from the results.
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B. STRATEGIC SEALIFT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
As discussed in Chapter IV, the SSIP presented a
notional acquisition profile for acquiring sealift ships to
meet current and future requirements for surge and follow-on
surge shipping. The primary emphasis of the SSIP is to
satisfy the delivery requirements for military combat unit
equipment (UE) established in the MRS. The SSIP is
essentially divided into two parts: the first part addresses
the acquisition method for the 24 knot LMSR to meet
prepositioning and surge requirements; the second part
addresses follow-on surge requirements.
In the SSIP, two alternatives for ship acquisition for
follow-on surge were evaluated, the active and inactive RRF.
The NDF alternative, although discussed, was not
specifically analyzed in the SSIP. This alternative is
similar to the active RRF, except the government would
supply funding for those commercial ships built or
retrofitted with NDF. Under this alternative, the Navy
would not own the ship nor receive leasing income.
Next, the SSIP financial analysis for follow-on surge
shipping is presented in more detail. This thesis is
specifically concerned with the results of this analysis.
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1. SSIP Financial Analysis
The SSIP conducted a life cycle cost analysis for each
alternative. This analysis centers on the concept of the
present value dollar cost per UE delivered within a time
frame of C+50 days (within 50 days of the initial deployment
date, or C-day) . Thus, the calculations are dependent not
only on ship costs, but also on ship size (cargo carrying
capacity, in square feet) and speed.
This section presents an overview of the SSIP
analysis; the analytical process, specific costs involved,
calculations and other important factors. The results of
the analysis are then discussed.
a. Analytical Process
The first step in this analysis was to determine
the costs that would be incurred for each alternative. This
involved estimating the initial ship acquisition costs, ship
replacement costs (if applicable) and maintenance costs that
were incurred during the ship's useful life. Once this was
determined, the present value of the estimated costs were
calculated at the required discount rate.
The second step was to determine the leasing income
that the Navy would gain under the active RRF alternative.
The present value of this income was also calculated at the
required discount rate.
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The net present value (NPV) for each alternative
was then determined. This simply entails adding the present
values of the costs (cash outflows) to the present value of
the leasing income (cash inflows)
,
(Appendix C addresses the
NPV method in more detail). After calculating the NPV, the
results must be scaled to adjust each alternative to a
common unit of measurement. In this analysis, the
appropriate unit of measurement was cargo capacity (square
feet of unit equipment) that can be delivered over a
particular time period. This is dependent upon ship size
and speed. Dividing the NPV by the cargo capacity gives the
resulting ship life cycle costs ($million/K-square feet)
.
Specific assumptions made in the SSIP concerning
the ship life cycle costs, including useful life, and size
and speed for each alternative are discussed in the
following section.
(1) Ship Useful Life. Ships that are newly
constructed under the active RRF alternative are assumed to
have a 40 year life. The SSIP assumes that these ships will
be operated in the commercial industry for 20 years and then
placed in the RRF in ROS for the remaining 20 years.
Likewise, when an existing commercial ship is
acquired for the inactive RRF, the ship's current age is
subtracted from the 40 year life to give the remaining
useful life of the ship. When this ship reaches the end of
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its useful life, a second ship is acquired and the same
process is repeated. Specifically, these calculations
assume that a ship would be purchased at the 15 year point
and then placed in the RRF for 25 years. At the end of 25
years, another commercial ship is purchased for replacement.
The replacement ship costs are factored into the
calculations. [Ref. 17: p. 11]
(2) Ship Size and Speed. Ship speed and size are
two major factors that must be considered in order to
compare the active and inactive RRF alternatives on an equal
basis. In the initial designs, shipyards and NAVSEA
estimated the size of the COM-20 active RRF ship to be
approximately 200,000 to 300,000 square feet of cargo
carrying capability. [Ref. 17: p. 14] For the calculations
presented in the composite graphs (following pages), the
size of the inactive RRF and active RRF ships were estimated
at 160,000 square feet and 240,000 square feet respectively.
[Ref. 17]
The SSIP analysis assumed a ship speed of 18 and
20 knots for the inactive and active RRF respectively.
Although ship speed is important, it has no effect on the
results of these specific calculations. These ships will be
used for follow-on surge cargo. Due to the cargo
availability schedule established in the MRS, these ships
are not expected to begin cargo delivery until approximately
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the C+21 day point. Once the ship is loaded at the C+21
point and arrives at the first destination, the C+50 limit
will have been reached. There probably would not be
sufficient time for a second trip. Within this restrictive
time frame, two knots will make very little difference.
[Ref .18]
b. Results
The analysis provides the life cycle cost ($
million) per thousand square feet of UE that can be
delivered by the ship in C+50 days [Ref. 17: Appendix D] .
This analysis was conducted using a discount rate of zero
percent, 4 percent and 10 percent.
Composite graphs for this analysis are presented on
the following pages (Figures 1,2 and 3) . Each graph shows
the variation in life cycle costs given the variation in
initial acquisition costs, variations in lease payments for
the active RRF option ($0 and $5 million) and the different
discount rates. [Ref. 17]
These graphs allow for relative comparison of the
two alternatives based upon the main variables presented
(acquisition costs and lease rate) . For example, using the
4 percent discount rate (Figure 2), assume that an active
RRF ship can be constructed at a cost of $200 million.
Assuming that the ship can be leased at a $5 million annual
rate, then the graph can be used to compare what the
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equivalent cost ($M/K Square Feet) of an inactive RRF ship
will be to provide the same capability at the same life
cycle costs. By choosing the $200 million point on the
active RRF ($5M/year revenue) line, move across horizontally
to the inactive RRF line and then identify the acquisition
cost that equates to the same level of life cycle cost for
the inactive RRF. This is approximately $18 million. If a
new construction costs are $200 million and an existing
commercial ship can be acquired for the inactive RRF at a
cost of $18 million or less, then purchasing an existing
ship would be the better alternative based on these life
cycle cost calculations.
The graphs show that the inactive RRF alternative
is less sensitive to acquisition costs than the active RRF
alternatives. Additionally, the higher the discount rate,
the less sensitive the inactive RRF alternative becomes to
acquisition costs. In particular, increases in the discount
rate decrease the slope of the inactive RRF line while the
slope of the active RRF line ($0 and $5 million leasing
income) remains relatively constant. As seen in Table 7, by
doubling the acquisition costs for each alternative, the
percent change in the life cycle cost for the active RRF
decreases as the discount rate increases, while the percent



























































































































































































LIFE CYCLE COSTS AT A 4 AND 10 PERCENT DISCOUNT RATE







% change 180% 160%
$20 0.75 0.4
$40 0.85 0.55
% change 13% 37.50%
The results of the study yielded no definite
conclusions regarding the preferred alternative. Instead,
the study provides a method of comparing alternatives based
on the initial acquisition costs of the ship. Identifying
the most cost effective alternative warrants further
analysis. The following uniform annual cost analysis
provides some of the required information.
C. UNIFORM ANNUAL COST ANALYSIS
The uniform annual cost analysis provides an improved
method for comparing the alternatives discussed. This
approach differs from the SSIP analysis in three ways.
First, as the name implies, the uniform annual cost analysis
is used to calculate an annual vice overall cost. This
allows the costs of ships with different life cycles to be
compared on an equal basis. Second, this analysis takes
into consideration a larger set of costs incurred under the
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alternatives. Specifically, the analysis includes merchant
marine reserve personnel training costs and ship scrap
values. Third, the analysis is expanded to evaluate the NDF
alternative
.
The guidelines for the uniform annual cost analysis are
drawn from various financial accounting textbooks (see
bibliography) and the Department of Defense instruction
entitled "Economic Analysis and Program Evaluation for
Resource Management" (DODD 7041.3). Instruction DODD 7041.3
provides guidelines for comparing alternative investments
with different useful or economic lives. 3 It states:
Uniform annual cost should be calculated when
alternatives have different economic lives. It is
obtained by dividing the total present value cost (NPV)
by the sum of the present value factors of the years in
which an alternative yields benefits [Ref. 20: p. 7].
Calculating the uniform annual costs for an investment
is essentially the same as determining the annual payments
that would be incurred with an annuity. An annuity is a
series of payments at equally spaced intervals over a given
period of time. [Ref. 23: p. 712] The basic formula for
determining this annual payment is as follows:
PV of the Future Cash Flows =
Annual Payments x Sum of Discount Factors
3Economic life is defined as the period that an alternative investment yields benefits [Ref. 20: p. 7]. For
purposes of this discussion, useful life and economic life have the same meaning.
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After calculating the present value of an annuity, the
annual payments can be determined by dividing this value by
the sum of the discount factors over the life of the
annuity. The main idea behind this approach is that an
aggregate total cost of an alternative is re-expressed as an
annual cost.
In the following section, an overview of the uniform
annual cost analysis is presented. This discusses the
uniform annual cost calculations and differences between
this analysis and the SSIP analysis. Also discussed are the
assumptions used in calculating the uniform annual costs.
1. Analysis Overview
When calculating the uniform annual costs for each
alternative investment, the NPV of the future cash flows,
both inflows and outflows, is determined as discussed in the
SSIP analysis. Once determined, the NPV is divided by the
sum of the discount factors over the life of the
investment. This provides the uniform annual costs. In
essence, the uniform annual cost is a measure of the average
annual cost of an alternative over its useful life.
Calculating the uniform annual costs represents a
different approach than the SSIP analysis for two main
reasons. First, this calculation presents costs on an
annual basis. This provides a method for comparing each
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alternative based on an annual cost vice an overall cost, as
in the SSIP.
Secondly, it allows for directly comparing
alternatives with different useful lives. For example, the
SSIP analysis assumed that a ship constructed under the
active RRF alternative would have a useful life of 40 years.
A ship acquired from the commercial market for the inactive
RRF would have a shorter useful life, estimated at 25 years.
To compensate for this shorter useful life, the SSIP
analysis incorporates acquisition costs for a second ship
from the commercial market at the 25 year point. This
extends the useful life of the inactive RRF out to 40 years
and beyond. In contrast, by calculating the uniform annual
cost, alternatives with different useful lives can be
compared on an equal basis. Consequently, the future
acquisition costs for the second inactive RRF ship are not
required in this analysis.
An important fact to point out is for the uniform
annual cost calculations to be valid it is assumed that at
the end of a ship's useful life, whether it be 40 or 25
years, another ship of approximately equal value will be





The uniform annual cost calculations for each
alternative are based on the acquisition costs, ship useful
life, ship size, leasing income (if applicable), and
maintenance and operating costs.
In general, the same factors used in the SSIP analysis
are used in this analysis, with some additional factors
included. First, the estimated costs for training personnel
in the proposed merchant marine reserve program are
incorporated in this analysis. Due to the RRF manning
problems, it is important to include these costs to more
accurately estimate the overall costs of each alternative.
Second, an estimate for the scrap value of the ship at the
end of its useful life is included, in order to incorporate
all future income that can be earned for each alternative.
Lastly, as stated previously, the NDF alternative is
included in this analysis. The same factors apply under the
NDF alternative except an operating differential subsidy
cost estimate is also included. If this alternative were
undertaken in the future, the government would have to pay
an operating differential subsidy to the ship operator to
offset the added costs of operation due to the NDFs
.
Therefore, this cost is included to better estimate the
total costs to the government for the NDF alternative.
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Next, the particular assumptions concerning the values
for the factors used in uniform annual costs calculations
for each alternative are addressed. The first section will
discuss the assumptions concerning the costs and income.
This is divided according to the three alternatives:
inactive RRF, active RRF and NDF. The second section will
present assumptions for ship size and speed. The results of
the uniform annual cost analysis are presented at the end of
this section. This will include a discussion of major
variables and how they effect the results. A uniform annual
cost example calculation is provided for each alternative in
Appendix C. This provides a detailed step by step procedure
for how these calculations were conducted.
a. Inactive RRF
(1) Acquisition Costs. The estimated acquisition
costs for current commercial RO/ROs will vary depending upon
the ship's size, type (diesel or steam, foreign or
domestically built) and age. The acquisition costs include
funds used to convert the ship for military use and any
additional costs to place the ship in the RRF. Estimates
for acquiring and converting current commercial ships are
generally in the range of $20 to $40 million. Initially,
for purposes of this calculation, it is assumed that the
acquisition costs are $40 million. [Ref. 9] [Ref. 17] [Ref.
191
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(2) Ship Useful Life. The estimated overall useful
life of a ship is approximately 40 years, at which point the
ship becomes obsolete and is scrapped. [Ref. 17] When a
ship is initially acquired by MARAD, its useful life for the
RRF will be the total time period it is available for use in
the RRF. Since older commercial ships are acquired by MARAD
for the RRF, it is safe to assume that the ship has reached
the end of its economic life. This will normally be
anywhere from 15 to 25 years. For this analysis, it is
assumed that the commercial ship would be acquired at the 15
year point, after commercial operation. At that point it is
converted and placed in the RRF. The conversion is assumed
to take one year. Thus the ship is assumed to have a 25
year expected life in the RRF. This is consistent with the
assumptions used in the SSIP analysis.
(3) Maintenance. The MRS requires that each of the
RO/ROs presently in the RRF, and any future RO/ROs acquired
for the RRF, be placed in ROS . These ships are very useful
for transporting military cargo. Therefore, they must be
available sooner than the other lower priority ships in the
RRF. ROS ships will be outported near their anticipated
equipment loading sites, have a small crew (8-10 members) on
board to maintain the ship and undergo sea trials on an
annual basis. The annual cost estimates for maintaining a
ship in an ROS status are presented in Table 8. These
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estimates are used for the yearly maintenance cash flow.
[Ref. 11: p. A-3]
(4) Merchant Marine Reserve Personnel. There will
also be costs associated with training reserve personnel to
man each inactive ship. MARAD estimates that it will cost
approximately $4600 per year to train an individual in the
proposed merchant marine reserve program [Ref. 19: p. 34].
Assuming that the required crew size for the ship is 30
members (estimated from current ship crew sizes) and there
are 8-10 ROS crew members already on board the ship, an
additional 22 crew members (30 less 8) will be required to
fully man the ship. These 22 potential crew members will be
trained in the reserve program at an annual cost of $101,200




Reduced Operating Status Annual Costs
(Thousands)
Activations (sea trials) $500.00
Logistics 103.00
Maintenance and Repair 875.00
Miscellaneous 825.00
Outporting 200.00
ROS Operating Crew 1 ,000.00
Ship Manager Fee 239.00
Total $3,742.00
[Ref. 11: p. A-3]
(5) Disinvestment (Sale/Scrap) . Scrap rates vary
widely from year to year depending upon the current market
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conditions. There is also a large difference between ship
scrap rates in the U.S. and foreign shipyards. Scrap rates
(per ton) tend to be lower in the U.S. due to higher
shipyard operating costs and restrictive environmental
regulations. In a U.S. shipyard, the scrap rate can vary
from $50 to $100 per ton, where in a foreign yard they can
vary from $70 to $140 per ton [Ref. 3], For this analysis
it is assumed that the ship is scrapped at a price of $50
per ton. This rate is used for conservatism, since the
lower scrap rate will least offset the NPV of the overall
ship costs. Assuming that the ship has a displacement of
40,000 Long Tons (LT) , the scrap value is $2 million
(=40,000 LT x $50 per ton). Scrap income was not factored
into the SSIP analysis.
Jb. Active RRF (COM-20)
(1) Acquisition Costs. With the design phase for
the COM-20 ship still in progress, there are no firm initial
cost estimates for constructing the ship. Even so, based on
the initial cost estimates for the 24 knot LMSR (discussed
in Chapter IV) the best estimate for the initial acquisition
costs of the COM-20 ship would be approximately $200 million
[Ref. 9]
.
The cash outlays for the construction will be
based on a four year contract, with the annual payment rate
based on the following schedule:
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• Year 1- 18%
• Year 2- 33%
• Year 3- 35%
• Year 4- 14% [Ref. 19: p. 7]
(2) Ship Useful Life. After the four year
construction period, the ship will be leased to the
commercial industry for 15 years. After 15 years it reaches
the end of its economic life. At that point, the ship is
placed into the RRF where it is maintained in ROS, just as
the inactive RRF ship in the previous discussion. During
the first 15 years of operation, the Navy will earn the
leasing income. When the ship is placed in the RRF, the
Navy will incur the same annual costs for maintaining a ship
in an ROS condition, including the annual training costs for
merchant marine reserve personnel.
The 15 year lease was chosen for two reasons.
First it is consistent with the assumption introduced in the
previous inactive RRF discussion. Secondly, it is more
conservative in comparison to the SSIP analysis assumptions,
which estimated that the ship would be leased for 20 years.
By assuming the ship is only leased for 15 years, the Navy
does not receive leasing income and must pay the required
maintenance costs for the extra five years the ship is in
the inactive RRF.
(3) Operating Income. It is hard to estimate the
actual leasing income. As previously discussed, the SSIP
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analysis uses a rate of $0 and $5 million. The $5 million
equates to a daily lease rate of approximately $14,000.
This is roughly equivalent to the current shipping market
bareboat charter rate. [Ref. 22] However, this lease rate
would represent a gross cash flow. Expenses incurred by the
Navy and MARAD for additional costs associated with the ship
leasing, (i.e., administrative costs, inspections, etc.)
must be deducted to determine the net cash flow. It is not
unlikely that the net cash flow from the ship leasing will
be zero.
The main purpose of leasing the ship is not to
recover costs or make a profit, as in a commercial lease,
but to avoid the yearly costs to maintain the same ship in
the RRF. The actual lease rate will be the rate supported
by the shipping market at the time. These rates vary widely
depending upon the economic and market conditions. For this
initial analysis a lease rate of $5 million will be used so
the results can easily be compared to the SSIP analysis
results. Different lease rates will be analyzed later in
the chapter.
(4) Maintenance and Merchant Marine Reserve
Personnel. Once the ship is placed into the RRF, it will be
maintained in ROS . The same costs incurred in the previous
discussion for the inactive RRF apply in this situation,
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including the annual cost of training the necessary
personnel in the Merchant Marine Reserve.
(5) Disinvestment (Sale/Scrap) . The initial designs
for the COM-20 ship estimates the ship to be approximately
40,000 LT. Using the scrap rate discussed previously, the
ship scrap value will be $2 million at the end of 40 years.
[Ref. 17]
c. National Defense Features (NDF)
(1) Acquisition Costs. The underlying factor that
will effect the construction costs for a commercial ship
with NDFs is the cost differential between constructing an
equivalent ship in a U.S. and foreign shipyard. In the
SSIP, MARAD estimated that the costs for a commercial ship
with NDFs, that was equivalent to the COM-20 ship, was
approximately $160 million in a U.S. shipyard. The costs
for constructing an equivalent ship (without NDFs) in a
foreign shipyard was $56 million (1991 dollars). Thus, the
commercial company would pay $56 million, and the U.S.
government $104 million ($160 less $56 million), for
constructing the ship. [Ref. 17: p. 20] This analysis
assumes that the government acquisition costs are $104
million. The four year payment rate presented in the active
RRF discussion (18%, 33%, 35% and 14%) is used for this
calculation.
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(2) Ship Useful Life. As discussed previously, a
commercial ship generally operates for 15 to 25 years. For
consistency with the previous discussions, this analysis
assumes that the ship is operated by a commercial shipping
company for 15 years. After 15 years, the ship is turned
over to MARAD and placed in the RRF in ROS . The ship is
retained in the RRF until it reaches 40 years. At this
point it is sold for scrap.
(3) Operating Differential Subsidies. Current
Operating Differential Subsidy (ODS) information is
published yearly in the MARAD Annual Report. The annual
report shows the names of the participating shipping
companies, the accrued ODS liabilities for MARAD and the ODS
paid to each shipping company over the past years (since
1937) . Although ODS payments are not listed on a ship by
ship basis, this information can be used to estimate the
operating subsidy that would be incurred if the Navy were to
subsidize a ship with NDFs . Estimates for the operating
subsidy used the current accrued ODS liability, the number
of ships receiving ODS and the time period remaining in the
ODS contract for each participating shipping company. An
average for the four companies is then taken. The results
are presented in Table 9.
This is a very rough approximation based on
historical data. Actual ODS funding for a particular ship
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is based on the size of the ship, the NDFs incorporated in
the ship construction and the trade for which the ship is
used (i.e., the trade route and the number of voyages per




Company ODS Liability # of ships Years Left1 ODS/ship/year
American President Lines $6,923,782 23 6 $50,172
Farrel Lines Inc. 1,022,385 5 4 $51,120
Lykes Brothers Steamship 14,323,618 27 7 $75,786
Waterman Steamship 2,790,797 4 5 $139,540
Average= $79,155
* Years remaimng in ODS contract.
"Source: MARAD 1990 annual Report.
(4) Maintenance and Merchant Marine Reserve
Personnel. After retiring from commercial use, the ship is
placed in the RRF in ROS . The same costs apply as
previously discussed, including the costs for training
reserve personnel.
(5) Disinvestment (Sale/Scrap) . At the end of the
ship's 40 year useful life, it is scrapped at the same value
assumed previously ($2 million)
.
d. Ship Size and Speed
This analysis uses the same assumptions presented
in the SSIP analysis for ship size and speed. Additionally,
since a size of 160,000 sq-ft and speed of 18 knots are used
for the inactive RRF commercial ship, the same size and
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speed assumptions are used for a new construction ship with
NDFs.
The size and speed of a ship are important
considerations for the active RRF alternative. As stated
previously, the initial size estimates for the COM-20 ship
is 200,000 to 300,000 square feet of cargo capacity. The
larger size and speed for the ship being proposed by the
Navy presents a problem. Comparable commercial RO/ROs are
slower and smaller. When commercial ships are designed and
built, the speed and size of the ship are kept in balance.
A ship that is too large and/or too fast can be more
expensive to operate than a smaller, slower ship. The
proposed COM-20 ship, which will be larger and faster than
presently operating commercial RO/ROs, will require a much
larger propulsion plant and consequently cost more to
operate. Therefore, it is likely that the Navy will have to
reduce the annual leasing rate to take this into account.




Table 10 displays the results of this analysis based
on the assumed values for the factors, as discussed above.
From these results it can be seen that the inactive RRF
alternative provides the lowest uniform annual cost per
thousand square feet of cargo capacity.
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TABLE 10
UNIFORM ANNUAL COSTS/K-Sq-Ft (UAC)
Alternative PVAcqu. PV Lease PV OPS PVROS PV Reserve PV Scrap NPV UAC
Active RRF (174.89) 28.57 N/A (6.1273) (0.1657) 0.03 (152.58) (0.0586)
Inactive RRF (40) N/A N/A (33.6400) (0.908) 0.18 (74.37) (0.0457)
NDF (91) N/A (0.4286) (6.1273) (0.1657) 0.03 (97.63) (0.0562)
These results can be compared to the SSIP analysis
results. Given a 10 percent discount rate, at an
acquisition cost of $200 million, the UAC for an active RRF
ship is 0.0586 ($M/K-sq-f t ) , whereas at an acquisition cost
of $40 million an inactive RRF ship has a UAC of 0.0457.
Thus, the inactive RRF is the most cost effective
alternative. These same conclusions are obtained with the
SSIP analysis (given the same acquisition cost estimates)
.
Additionally, from the results of the UAC analysis, it can
be seen that the NDF alternative is competitive with the
active RRF alternative.
In order to thoroughly examine each alternative and
determine the best one, it is necessary to look at the
variables presented and discuss how each effects the
calculations. The following section presents a sensitivity
analysis for the major variables in the calculations. These
include acquisition costs, lease rates and discount rates.
The results of this sensitivity analysis are presented in
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Figure 6. Acquisition Cost vs. Uniform Annual Costs (15% Discount Rate)
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For this sensitivity analysis, the ROS maintenance
costs were assumed constant, since these costs will not vary
greatly from year to year. Reviewing Table 10 shows that
the present value of the assumed annual costs for the
merchant marine reserve program under each alternative is
small compared to the present value of the other variables.
The same conclusion can be drawn about the present value of
the operating differential subsidy (ODS) under the NDF
alternative. Additionally, since the cash inflow from the
ship scrap is well into the future, its' present value is
small. Due to these facts, all of the above values were
held constant during this sensitivity analysis.
a. Acquisition Costs
The acquisition costs are the largest cash outflow
and occur in the first years of the investment life cycle.




The lease rate used for the analysis of the active
RRF alternative has a great effect on the resulting
conclusions. To analyze this, a lease rate of $0, $2.5 and
$5 million was used. Additionally, to consider a worst case
scenario, the uniform annual cost analysis was also
conducted for a COM-20 ship that was not leased after
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construction. Instead the ship was placed into the RRF in
ROS for its 40 year useful life.
The purpose of varying the lease rate is to provide
a further method of comparison. When a better estimate of
the lease rate for a COM-20 ship can be obtained, the graphs
allow for comparing uniform annual costs at that particular
lease rate to determine comparable acquisition costs for
each alternative.
c. Discount Rate
In the standard NPV analysis, the discount rate
reflects the alternative uses for the required capital and
the riskiness of the investment. For the commercial
company, earning a profit is of the utmost concern. The
discount rate is often compared to a "hurdle rate". If an
investment can earn a return greater than its hurdle rate,
then the company will undertake the project. [Ref. 18: p.
592] However, this concept in many respects does not apply
to government investments. Government's goal is to maximize
the capabilities of strategic sealift while minimizing the
overall costs.
The guidelines for the discount rate to be used in
economic analysis is set forth in DODD 7041.3, which states:
Interest will be treated as a cost which is
related to all Government expenditures, regardless of
whether there are revenues or income by way of special
taxes for a project to be self-sustaining. This policy
is based on the premise that no public investment
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should be undertaken without explicitly considering the
alternative use of the funds which it absorbs or
displaces [Ref. 20: p. 6].
The reasoning behind the standard ten percent
discount rate is that it reflects forgone private sector
investment opportunities (opportunity costs). The discount
rate is determined by the preference for current and future
money sacrifices that the private sector shows in private
investments. Thus, the prescribed discount rate of ten
percent represents an estimate of the average rate of return
on private investment before corporate taxes and after
adjusting for inflation. [Ref. 20: p. 6-7] This definition
for investment opportunity costs is only valid if the
government funds projects that have an NPV greater than
zero. If the budget is set without regard to the NPV for
government projects, as it is, return in the private sector
is irrelevant for government discount rate decisions.
Additional research has been conducted on this
topic. Some analysts recommend using lower discount rates,
such as the consumer rate of interest, the Treasury bill
rate, or a weighted average of the consumer rate of interest
and the pre-tax corporate rate of return. [Ref. 21: pp. 17-
18] Still others stress the 'opportunity cost' approach,
where the correct discount rate should reflect the
opportunity cost of each alternative investment being
considered within a set government budget. As the
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government budget (especially the military budget) becomes
smaller, this opportunity cost discount rate increases
because there is less money available to fund these
alternative projects. Therefore DOD may want to consider a
discount rate other than the standard ten percent.
d. Conclusions From the Results
The graphs for the uniform annual cost analysis are
presented in a different format than those in the SSIP
analysis. Uniform annual costs are presented on the X-axis
and the acquisition costs on the Y axis. This is done to
emphasize the fact that when the discount rate increases,
the magnitude of the acquisition costs decreases, for a
given uniform annual cost.
Some important conclusions can be drawn from the
graphs
:
• Acquisition Costs- the slope of the line for each
alternative reflects the sensitivity of the uniform annual
costs to the acquisition costs. The slope of the lines for
the active RRF and NDF alternatives are higher than the
inactive RRF. This implies that the uniform annual costs
for the inactive RRF are more sensitive to the acquisition
costs than the other two alternatives.
The acquisition costs will have a strong effect on the
results of the analysis. Estimated acquisition costs for
each alternative were discussed previously. In particular,
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estimated costs were $200 million for the active RRF, $104
million for the NDF and $40 million for the inactive RRF.
Given these best estimates, the most cost effective
alternative is the inactive RRF. It has a lower uniform
annual cost. What effect do variations in these acquisition
costs have on the final results? To determine this, values
50 percent above and below these estimates are considered.
The corresponding uniform annual costs are presented in
Table 11 (10 percent discount rate).
TABLE 11
Acqu. Cost ($5M) UAC






Inactive RR $60 0.058
$40 0.046
$20 0.033
From the table it can be seen that at higher
acquisition costs the inactive RRF alternative is the most
cost effective. At lower acquisition costs, the active RRF
and NDF alternatives more cost effective. Therefore, the
initial acquisition costs for each alternative will have a
strong effect on the outcome of the analysis.
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Active RRF ($5M) $200
NDF $104
Inactive RRF $40
• Discount Rate- assuming the best estimated
acquisition costs and a $5 million annual lease rate, Table
12 shows how the uniform annual costs change as the discount
rate increases. This table demonstrates two important









1. As the discount rate increases (from the 10 percent
originally assumed) , the inactive RRF alternative becomes
even more attractive relative to the other two alternatives.
Conversely, at a lower discount rate the active RRF becomes
the preferred alternative.
2. As the discount rate increases, the uniform annual
costs will increase. Recall in the earlier discussion that
the uniform annual cost is the same as calculating the
annual payment on an annuity. For the same initial
investment, the annual payments increase with the interest
rate on an annuity. The same situation applies here. Given
the same initial acquisition costs, the uniform annual costs




• Lease Rate- the active RRF alternative is only
competitive with the inactive RRF or NDF alternative at a
lease rate of $5 million of higher. At $0 or $2.5 million,
the active RRF is not a cost effective alternative. The
lease rate effects the analysis results in an indirect way.
When the assumed lease rate is lowered, the comparative
acquisition costs for a given uniform annual costs
decreases. For example, at a 10 percent discount rate, the
uniform annual costs for a $40 million inactive RRF ship is
0.0457. The comparative acquisition costs (same uniform
annual costs) for the active RRF at a lease rate of $0, $2.5
and $5 million are $127, $144 and $160 million respectively
and for the NDF alternative it is $82 million. Thus for a
$5 million decrease in the annual lease payments, the active
RRF comparative acquisition costs decrease by $33 million
($160 less $127) . This is a major difference. The $33
million could purchase another inactive RRF ship.
Therefore, if the active RRF alternative is undertaken, it
is important to consider the potential lease income and the
acquisition costs. Otherwise, this alternative is not cost
effective
.
With the previous discussions, some general
conclusions can be drawn concerning the preferred
alternative. As stated previously, with the current best
estimates for the acquisition costs of each alternatives,
the inactive RRF is the most cost effective alternative.
This preference becomes stronger as the discount rate and
acquisition costs increase. Conversely, at a lower discount
rate and lower acquisition costs the active RRF provides the
most cost effective alternative.
D. SUMMARY
Each alternative, inactive RRF, active RRF and NDF, must
be evaluated based on its ability to meet the current
sealift shortfalls (urgency) and provide a long term
solution to the sealift problem. The alternative that
provides the most sealift capability at the lowest cost is
of course preferred.
The uniform annual cost analysis discussed in this
chapter represents a more comprehensive approach in
determining the best alternative for meeting current and
future strategic sealift needs. The resulting graphs from
the analysis allow for comparing each alternative, based on
the annual lease rate, discount rate and acquisition costs
of the ship. The results of this analysis show that each
alternative is a cost effective approach to acquiring
sealift assets under different values for the most critical
factors: acquisition costs, lease rate and discount rate.
There are also broader financial and non-financial
considerations that must be taken into account. The next
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chapter discusses other factors that must be considered when




Given the current sealift situation, it is critical to
provide additional capacity for surge and follow-on surge
shipping, as established in the MRS. It is imperative that
all options for acquiring additional sealift capacity are
considered equally. Chapter V stressed financial
comparisons between three alternatives. As always, budget
constraints will limit the number of choices available to
decision makers. This makes future decisions for acquiring
sealift ships that much tougher.
In this chapter specific benefits and drawbacks for each
alternative are presented exploring both financial and non-
financial considerations for these alternatives. These
include concerns for the commercial shipbuilding and
shipping industry, political environment, current status of
the RRF and availability of ships in the future.
B. BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS
This discussion is divided into six areas of interest:
ship acquisition and maintenance costs, shipbuilding
industry, shipping industry, ship lead time and
availability, political environment and other
considerations. These areas are addressed in this section
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because they will have an important impact on the decisions
made in the future.
1. Ship Acquisition and Maintenance Costs
Current and future budget constraints are important
factors when considering the three alternatives.
Traditionally, within the Navy, sealift has been a
relatively low priority. The initial acquisition and
conversion costs for inactive RRF ship from the current
commercial market are substantially lower than the
acquisition costs for the other alternatives.
An additional consideration when discussing initial
acquisition costs is the provision for sale of obsolete
vessels in the NDRF under section 510 (i) of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936, as amended in 1977. MARAD can acquire
suitable vessels for the NDRF by selling obsolete NDRF
vessels. This can be accomplished by either trading the
ships directly, or selling them for scrap during favorable
market conditions and using the funds at a later date to
acquire suitable commercial ships for the NDRF. Under the
current law, these funds cannot be used for the construction
of new ships, therefore they cannot be used for the active
RRF or NDF alternatives. [Ref. 3: p. 11] With increased
sales of the older obsolete NDRF vessels in upcoming years,
funds will be available for acquiring newer RO/ROs to meet
the follow-on surge requirements. This reduces the
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appropriations and budgeted funds needed for ship
acquisition in the near term.
The initial drawbacks of the higher acquisition costs
for the active RRF and NDF alternatives must be weighed
against the future benefits of deferring ship maintenance.
For the active RRF, leasing would eliminate maintenance
costs and provide some revenue for the government. This
would increase the funds available for acquiring future
ships and maintaining ships currently in the RRF and would




Constructing new ships in the U.S. would improve the
shipyard industrial base. This would have effects
throughout the U.S. economy including the steel, machine and
manufacturing industries. Government revenues would rise
due to increased taxable revenue from industry profits and
income from the additional employed workers, and
expenditures would decrease due to lower unemployed workers
compensation. Conversely, under the inactive RRF
alternative, there is less overall shipyard construction
work. This alternative would not maintain the minimum
shipyard industrial base required to meet future RRF
maintenance and support needs. [Ref. 19: p. 18]
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However, the argument presented for the construction
of new ships in the U.S. is valid only if there is an
unlimited supply of capital and labor in the markets. This
is not the case. First, capital is a scarce resource.
Secondly, even though the country is currently in a
recession, there will not always be high unemployment in the
U.S. economy. Therefore, by investing in the construction
of new ships in the U.S., the government is taking capital
and labor that might well be used in more efficient and
profitable areas of the U.S. economy. This would have a
negative impact on the economy and reduce the overall
potential tax revenue for the government. Therefore,
consideration for enhancing the U.S. shipbuilding industry
in order to meet future RRF maintenance and support needs
must be weighed against the costs for not using that capital
and labor in other areas of the economy.
3. The Shipping Industry
The following discussion emphasizes several important
considerations concerning the U.S. and world shipping
industry:
• The RO/RO is a specialized ship that is employed in a
relatively restrictive market (car carrier trades). This
has two potential drawbacks:
(1) It will limit the number of RO/ROs built in the
future. This reduces the number of RO/ROs that are
potentially available to replace the current and future
inactive RO/ROs in the RRF.
(2) It will potentially limit the actual commercial use
for the COM-20 ships (if they are built) in the future,
precluding the Navy from leasing these ships.
Historically, demand for shipping is volatile. The
shipping industry typically expands capacity rapidly during
periods of strong market growth, only to fall into depressed
periods with little demand and large over capacity. The
projected demand for RO/ROs shows a modest increase into
1995. [Ref. 17] However, projecting ship demand into future
years involves much uncertainty. Ten years from now, the
shipping market for RO/ROs may be gone, making the COM-20
ship obsolete.
• For the inactive RRF, there is a potential future
danger of relying on the commercial industry to provide
RO/RO ships for the RRF. There are a limited number of
U.S. commercial RO/ROs that meet military requirements for
capacity and speed [Ref. 17]. In future years, when the
RO/ROs currently in the RRF become obsolete, there may not
be enough ships available for replacement.
Additionally, there are many potential problems when
acquiring foreign vice U.S built ships for the RRF. More
money must be invested to upgrade and convert the ship to
meet USCG and TABS specifications. There may be future
problems in maintaining these ships and obtaining spare
parts, which could greatly increase future maintenance and
operating costs.
• Constructing and leasing the COM-20 ships could
potentially enhance the U.S. shipping industry's position
in the world trade market by providing additional U.S.
ships, at lower overall construction and operating costs.
U.S. ship operators leasing government vessel do not incur
depreciation and other construction costs for the ships.
Therefore, the shipping company can operate the ship on a
more competitive basis, with lower overall costs and higher
profits. [Ref. 17: pp. 14-15]
Even so, this alternative may not be economically
feasible for the world shipping market. In the worst
circumstance, these new ships may displace some of the
existing U.S. RO/ROs actively involved in the U.S. foreign
trade, particularly the charter market, destructively
competing with the U.S shipping industry. A strong
political backlash from the shipping industry could result.
Overall, the U.S. shipping industry may oppose the concept
of a 'military controlled' fleet of commercial ships.
• The maritime industry would probably prefer the NDF
alternative, where privately owned ships are constructed and
operated using government subsidies. The major drawback for
this alternative is that these ships would not fall under
government ownership.
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The next section of the Defense Mobility Requirements
Study (MRS) will be released soon and will address issues
for sealift sustainment cargo requirements [Ref. 17: p. 1].
In this section of the MRS, breakbulk and containerships
will be emphasized, where the commercial market is much
larger. An active RRF approach for acquiring and operating
sustainment cargo ships may become more attractive and
feasible. There will also be a readily available present
and future supply of commercial ships for the inactive RRF.
4 . Ship Lead Time and Availability
This section addresses two issues: lead time (how soon
ships can be available for sealift considering construction
and conversion lead time) and ship availability (will ships
be available to deliver follow-on surge cargo when needed)
.
a. Lead Time
Having the proper number of ships available when
they are needed is of the utmost strategic importance. The
MRS stipulates that additional ships for the RRF must be
acquired in a timely manner to meet the follow-on surge
requirements. [Ref. 17: p. 21] The inactive RRF ships can
be acquired more rapidly. Conversion requires one year
while new construction requires four. The larger lead time
for the active RRF and NDF alternatives reduces the ability
of these alternatives to meet current follow-on surge
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requirements. In the near term, this greatly concerns
logistics planners.
b. Availability
Availability of ships is also an issue. Since the
inactive RRF ship will be outported in ROS near their
designated loadout sites, the government has ready access to
these ships. Thus, they can be available sooner than either
the active RRF or NDF ships. This assumes that the inactive
RRF ships are well maintained. If these vessels are not
properly maintained, they will not perform up to standard
when needed. This delays their availability (as was
observed in Operation Desert Shield/Storm) . In many
respects, a fleet of active RRF or NDF ships can be more
reliable and responsive in a national emergency or
contingency. These ships will be fully operational and
crewed when recalled [Ref. 17: p. 15].
It would be cost prohibitive to maintain a newly
acquired inactive RRF ship in the same operational condition
as an active RRF ship. Placing the ship in ROS would
maintain the inactive RRF ship in an equivalent status to
the active RRF or NDF ship. Unfortunately, there may not be
enough funding to maintain all the present and potential
RO/ROs in ROS. If funding is not available, the condition
of these ships will significantly deteriorate. This was
illustrated during the activations for Operation Desert
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Shield/Storm. This would be unsatisfactory. It is
imperative that these ships, if acquired, are properly
maintained for future operations.
5. Current RRF Situation
The issue of supporting and maintaining ships
currently in the RRF has not been discussed. As Operation
Desert Shield/Storm proved, the state of the RRF was below
that required for the ships to respond within the required
time frame. The only way to maintain the RRF ships in the
proper state of readiness is through increased funding for
maintenance and operations.
Several RRF enhancement issues have been addressed
within DOD and MARAD, including:
• Maintaining higher priority ships, such the RO/ROs, in
ROS status.
• Revising current RRF lay-up and maintenance
procedures
.
• Increasing the activation schedule for all RRF ships.
• Improving ship spare parts inventories and controls.
• Revising ship manager contracts.
• Establishing a Civilian Merchant Marine Reserve
program. [Ref. 11: pp. 1-4, 5]
All these initiatives will require increased funding
for any significant improvement to occur. With the current
and future military budgets, the funding to properly
maintain the RRF will probably not be available.
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This situation emphasizes the need for a centralized
approach to funding and managing sealift assets. Given the
funding available, the newly established National Defense
Sealift Fund (NDSF) will give the Navy the flexibility to
meet current and future sealift ship acquisition
requirements, while maintaining the existing sealift assets
in the best operational condition possible. The NDSF
presents a great improvement over the current decentralized
funding and operations of the military sealift program,
which has lead to discontinuity and indecision within DOD
and MARAD over the future direction of the sealift program.
Maintaining the trained merchant marine personnel
required to man the RRF ships will continue to be a major
problem. The active RRF and NDF alternatives would provide
trained personnel to operate these and other RRF ships,
alleviating the need for a Merchant Marine Reserve program.
However, the opportunity costs of this labor must be
considered. This labor is free if there is an unlimited
future supply of labor. As stated previously, this is not
the case. There is an opportunity cost for employing these
personnel on merchant ships vice other areas of private
industry. These individuals may be worth more when employed
in other industries. Therefore, the question becomes
whether the opportunity cost difference for using this labor
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in the merchant industry exceeds the cost of training the
same personnel in a Merchant Marine Reserve program.
6. The Political Environment
The political environment in the shipping industry is
also important in this decision process. The Bush
administration recently proposed a new operating
differential subsidy program to help stem decreases in the
U.S. maritime industry. Under this new proposal, the
current operating subsidy program will expire within the
next few years. This program would be replaced by a
contingency-retainer program. This would give participating
shipping companies a flat-fee payment in return for
agreement to make their ships available in a national
emergency or contingency. This plan would also allow
shipping companies to use money currently under Capital
Construction Fund programs for constructing newer ships in
foreign shipyards, excluding those ships constructed in
heavily subsidized foreign shipyards. Still, industry
leaders want additional, tougher requirements, (e.g.,
legislation levying penalties against foreign owners who
bring heavily subsidized ships into U.S. ports). [Ref. 24]
All these factors must be considered when evaluating
the alternatives. If the U.S. government penalizes heavily
subsidized foreign ships, the Navy may not be able to
justify the active RRF program, since it is essentially a
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government ship construction subsidy program. In addition,
if future legislation significantly changes the U.S.
maritime industry, an active RRF program may not be needed,
since there may be a larger number of active shipping
companies operating in the U.S.
7 . Other Considerations
The following are additional considerations for each
alternative
:
• Potential problems may develop due to differences
between Navy and commercial shipping industry standards for
ship maintenance and operation. If the COM-20 ships are
leased, the Navy may impose standards (e.g., operating,
maintenance and inspections) that are too stringent for the
commercial shipping industry to economically maintain.
This may reduce commercial interest in these ships.
Consequently, the Navy may not be able to place all the
burden for maintaining the ship(s) on the lessee. This
would lower lease rates.
• Additional consideration must be given to the
financial health of the various ship owners and operators
that undertake future active RRF or NDF ventures. If the
government incurs the large up front construction costs for
these ships and the ship operator cannot use the ship or
the company fails, then the Navy and MARAD are responsible
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for properly maintaining that ship in the RRF, creating a
future drain on RRF funds.
D. CONCLUSIONS
All factors, including financial, economic and
political, must be considered in determining how to acquire
sealift ships. The unique dual role of the U.S. maritime
industry, as a vehicle for U.S. commerce and trade and a
source of shipping capability during a national emergency or
contingency, continues to be a major factor in present and
future military sealift planning. The future need for
merchant ships is largely driven by national security needs.
As the U.S. maritime industry continues its steady decline,
the U.S. armed forces will have to increasingly rely on
government owned shipping to carry UE and sustainment cargo
wherever and whenever needed. [Ref. 25: p. 3]
The analysis presented in this thesis provides a
comprehensive way to view the RRF ship acquisition decision
process. The overall goal, as stressed above, is to provide
the maximum capability with the minimum costs to the
government. In addition, a successful RRF program must
provide the necessary shipyard capability and manpower to
successfully activate and operate the ships in the RRF when
needed. Within the context of this analysis, it appears
that the active RRF and NDF alternatives provide the best
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support for the U.S. maritime industry. Yet, given the
analysis results and the other issues discussed in this
chapter, the inactive RRF still presents the best capability
for the least costs. This conclusion is based on the
following reasons:
• There is too much economic uncertainty concerning the
future employment of the COM-20 ship in world trade. The
active RRF alternative is only cost competitive with the
inactive RRF alternative if the ship(s) is producing
leasing income for the government.
• There is too much uncertainty about the political
feasibility of the active RRF alternative. Current
initiatives to pass legislation discouraging foreign
governments from subsidizing merchant ship construction
make the active RRF less feasible, since the construction
of these ships would be entirely subsidized by the U.S.
government
.
• Inactive RRF ships can be available sooner. This meets
the urgent MRS follow-on surge requirements.
• Lower acquisition costs for the inactive RRF
alternative are more compatible with the current and future
defense budget constraints. Additionally, the inactive RRF
provides the best balance between expenditures to acquire
new ships for the RRF and maintain the current RRF ships in
the proper readiness condition.
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With the current RRF enhancement initiatives in
progress, including the increased funding for activations
and maintenance and the proposed Merchant Marine Reserve
program, the operational capabilities of the RRF will be
further increased, providing a viable sealift force the
future
.
As it presently stands, the MRS notional acquisition
profile purchases 18 existing commercial RO/ROs through 1996
(inactive RRF alternative). The SSIP presents an
alternative acquisition profile. Under this profile, the
follow-on surge requirements are met by acquiring 11
commercial RO/ROs for the inactive RRF by 1993. In later
years, a new construction program (active RRF) will be used
to increase RRF capability into the next century. [Ref. 17:
pp. 20-22] Thus, under current plans, the active RRF
program will not be implemented for several years.
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APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY OF READY RESERVE FORCE SHIPS
1. Roll -on/Roll -off ship (RO-RO) - these ships are mainly
used for surge UE and movement of other oversized equipment.
Vehicles can be driven on and off ramps, normally in the
stern of the ship, and for many RO-RO designs there are
additional cargo areas for carrying other bulk cargo and
containers. Due to their military applicability, these
types of ships are currently of major concern to DOD for
strategic sealift planning.
2. Breakbulk- this is the standard general cargo vessel.
These ships are used to carry general dry cargo items. They
are particularly useful for military cargo since they are
equipped with on-board booms and heavy cranes for loading
and unloading cargo. In addition, these ships are normally
smaller than newer container ships and RO-ROs and therefore
can operate in shallower ports. These ships are normally
used for resupply operations.
3. Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH)- these ships have an on-
board overhead traveling crane which is used for lifting
floating barges (lighters) from the stern of the ship and
then moving the barge, loaded with cargo, to the proper hold
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for storage. These ships are used mainly for transport of
bulk, sustainment cargo.
4. SEABEE Ship- this type of ship is different from the
LASH in that the barges are lifted by an elevator, in the
stern of the ship, where they are then moved to different
deck levels for storage. These ships are also used for
carrying sustainment cargo.
Note that both the LASH and SEABEE ships are
essentially self sustaining in that they do not require
pierside cranes to load or unload their cargo (barges),
unlike standard container ships. Only two to three tug
boats are required to transport the floating barges to and
from the ship during loading and unloading.
5. Auxiliary Crane Ship (TACS)- these are modified
container ships equipped with heavy lift cranes. These
ships are used in conjunction with non-self sustaining
ships, such as container ships, to help off load cargo in
forward deployed areas. They are capable of off-loading
various types of cargo. Additionally, the TACS are often
equipped with sealift enhancement features (flat tracks and
sea sheds) and are able to carry a large amount of cargo.
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6. Tankers- there are eleven tankers in the RRF capable
of carrying different types of liquid cargo. Several of
these tankers are also able to perform underway
replenishment
.
7. Troopships- there are two troopships in the RRF.
These are normally used to deliver augmented forces to the
forward deployed areas. [Ref. 1: pp. 36-37]
8. Aviation Logistics Support Ship (TAVB) - two RO/RO /
Containerships that are under commercial contract to MSC.
Each ship carries an Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA)
to support deploying MEB aviation units.
9. Hospital Ships (TAH)- two ships, one on the East
coast and one on the West coast, assigned to MSC and
operated by civilian crews. These ships are used in forward





U.S. SHIP CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT PROGRAMS
Simple economics is the reason behind the need for
subsidies in the U.S. maritime industry. There is generally
a large disparity of labor costs between the U.S. and other
nations of the world, particularly third world and less
industrialized countries. Therefore, when constructing a
merchant ship in a U.S. vice foreign shipyard, the only way
the U.S. shipyard can compete on a cost effective basis is
through higher productivity or government subsidies.
Since the end of World War II no area of the U.S.
maritime industry has been harder hit than shipbuilding.
The continued operation of many heavily subsidized foreign
shipyards and the reduction of U.S. subsidies for
shipbuilding has essentially eliminated commercial merchant
ship construction in U.S. shipyards.
A ship operator wishing to acquire a new ship can choose
between constructing a ship in a foreign or U.S. shipyard.
The decision will affect the method of financing for the
ship construction and the overall capital costs. A major
factor underlying a ship operator's choice is the relative
financial strength of the shipbuilding company and the level




The ship operator can choose to construct the new ship
in a foreign shipyard and raise the necessary capital
through a commercial bank loan or equity financing. In
general, if the ship operator is unable to raise the
necessary capital, the second alternative is to apply for
U.S government assistance. The three main forms of U.S.
maritime ship construction support include: the Construction
Differential Subsidy, the Federal Ship Financing program
(Title XI), and the Capital Construction Fund Program. The
following is an overview of each program:
1. Construction Differential Subsidy
The Construction Differential Subsidy (CDS) program
was established under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and
amended by the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. It provides
federal subsidies for ships constructed in U.S. shipyards
and used in U.S. foreign trade. The proposed ship must meet
approved engineering and construction standards, including
features that make the ship militarily useful (National
Defense Features) . MARAD, upon review of the ship
construction proposal, will approve the construction of the
ship and determine the amount of subsidy through either
negotiated contract, or the difference between a U.S.
competitive bid and the lowest foreign cost bid for an
equivalent vessel. [Ref. 15: pp. 94-95] [Ref. 16: pp. 468-
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470] As of 1983, the CDS was suspended and the program is
not used by the U.S. commercial shipping industry.
2. Federal Ship Financing Program (Title XI)
Under the Federal Ship Financing program the U.S.
government will fully guarantee the debt obligations issued
by a U.S. shipping company when used to finance commercial
ship construction. This guarantee enables the company to
obtain a high AAA credit rating, thus providing the
following benefits:
• Lower interest Rates on debt obligations.
• Longer financing terms (up to 25 years)
.
• No requirements of personal guarantees by the ship's
owners
.
If the shipping company should default on the debt
obligation, Title XI guarantees full payment of all interest
and unpaid principal. If this should occur, MARAD will take
control of the vessel, where it is placed in the NDRF until
it can be sold at some future date.
The amount that is guaranteed by the government is
based on the actual costis of the ship. When the vessel is
built using CDS, the government will guarantee up to 75
percent of the vessel's capitalized costs. If CDS is not
used, then 87.5 percent of the capitalized costs are
guaranteed. [Ref. 15: pp. 95-96]
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3. Capital Construction Fund
The Capital Construction Fund (CCF) was authorized
under a 1970 amendment to Section 607 of the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936. Though the terms of CCF can get complicated,
in general they allow the shipping company to accumulate the
capital needed for future ship construction. This is done
through a method of Federal income tax deferrals on money or
other property that can be used for the purchase of
qualified ships built in the U.S. and for the repayment of
debt used to finance the acquisition of these qualified
ships
.
The shipping company can establish a CCF account in
the bank of its choice. Deposits into the fund have a
maximum and minimum requirement: the maximum limit is set to
control the resulting tax deferment used by the company; the
minimum limit is set to ensure a sufficient amount of funds
are on deposit to accomplish the CCF objectives.
Deposits are made into one of three different accounts
under CCF, depending upon the type of funds deposited:
1. Deposits into the Ordinary Income Account are from
income that would have been taxable to the company. This
allows the company to reduce their total tax liability by
the amount deposited into the fund.
2. Deposits into the Capital Gains Account are funds
that would have otherwise been taxed at the current capital
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gains rate. This allows the company to defer those taxes
until the funds are withdrawn at a later date.
3. Deposits into the Capital Account include items,
such as depreciation, that are not taxable. This allows the
company to invest these funds and defer the tax on any
earnings or gains from the investments in the account, since
all earnings and gains from fund deposits must be deposited
back into the fund. [Ref. 15: pp. 96-102]
As the fund account levels increase, the company can
make qualified withdrawals to finance the construction of a
new ship or make payments on debt incurred to acquire an
existing ship under CCF. Qualified withdrawals are
subjected to special tax considerations linked with the ship
acquisition. Non-qualified withdrawals can also be made.
These withdrawals are generally subjected to the regular tax
rates for the company.
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APPENDIX C
NET PRESENT VALUE AND UNIFORM ANNUAL COST
A. DISCUSSION
The problem in any capital investment decision is
determining which alternative provides the best combination
of value (not necessarily monetary value) and cost. When
evaluating the financial feasibility of capital investments
there must be decision rules to help the manager choose
between alternatives A method commonly used to assist a
manager's decision process is the Net Present Value (NPV)
model
.
The NPV model is often used by managers to help estimate
the relative profitability of capital investment
alternatives. The NPV model summarizes the economic value
of an alternative in a single dollar amount as of a given
point in time. [Ref. 18: p. 591] For the NPV model, the
following factors must be taken into account:




Sale/scrap values at the end of useful life for an
asset.
The cash flows for a particular investment are the
differential, or incremental, cash flows that will occur if
the particular investment is undertaken, as opposed to the
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'status-quo', or current situation. Non-incremental costs
should not be included in the analysis since they will be
incurred regardless of the decision made. Sunk costs should
not be considered for the same reason.
Decisions concerning future replacement costs must also
be considered for alternatives with different economic or
useful lives. For example, if one alternative has a ten
year useful life while another has a 20 year useful life,
then the costs for replacing the first alternative at the
ten year point must be taken into account. However, the
purpose of calculating uniform annual costs (for this
thesis) is to compare alternative investments with different
useful lives. Therefore, replacement costs are not factored
into these calculations.
Finally, any scrap or sale value for an asset at the end
of useful life should also be included in the NPV
calculations. This should reflect the market value of the
asset at the time of sale or scrap.
The basic structure of the NPV model is simple. The
equation for NPV is as follows:
NPV = £c
n
x(l + d)- B
n=0
where Cn=Cash inflows or outflows at the end of period n,
d= the discount rate.
n= the time period the cash flow occurs.
N= overall time period of the investment, normally
in years.
108
The setup for the analysis is described as follows:
• Estimate all future cash flows, both inflows and
outflows
.
• Find the present value of each cash flow by
discounting at the prescribed discount rate.
• Sum the discounted cash flows, which gives the NPV of
the project.
• If an investment has a positive NPV, it should be
undertaken: if it is negative, it should be rejected. With
alternative investment decisions, the investment with the
highest NPV should be chosen, provided the investment (s) is
within set budget constraints.
The standard NPV analysis will divide the future cash
flows into four general categories; investments, periodic
inflows and outflows, depreciation tax shield and
disinvestment (scrapping or selling the asset at end of
useful) .
Tax considerations are taken into account for NPV
analysis because it is the company's net after tax cash
inflow or outflow that effects the bottom line. However,
this thesis considers an investment by a public organization
(government) , not a private organization. Therefore, tax
factors are not included in the analysis.
Depreciation is important for a company because it has a
direct effect on the company's taxes. Depreciation is not a
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cash flow, but an allocation of investment costs to the
periods when benefits for that asset are incurred. What is
important when considering depreciation is the differential
cash flow due to the depreciation tax shield of the new
investment and any depreciation tax shield foregone due to
the retirement of an old asset. Since the public
organization does not pay taxes, depreciation is not
incorporated into this analysis.
An important factor in the NPV analysis is the timing of
cash flows. This is due to the effect of discounting on
those future cash flows (time value of money). Simply put,
a dollar today is worth more than a dollar sometime in the
future. For each dollar at hand there are alternative
investment opportunities, and thus a chance to earn some
interest rate, or return, over a period of time. Also, the
fact that inflation reduces the value of money year to year
is a factor in the time value of money.
To factor in the effects of the time value of money, the
future cash flows for a given investment are adjusted to
their present value at a given discount rate. This discount
rate will vary depending upon the current economic
conditions and the rate of inflation. This will affect the
rate of return on alternative investments and hence the NPV.
Generally, the discount rate that is used is the cost of
borrowing the necessary capital to undertake an investment.
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Thus, if an investment has an NPV of zero, it provides
enough return to recover the costs of the initial investment
and the borrowing costs (interest costs), plus any operating
costs incurred. This assumes that there is an unlimited
supply of capital in the market. Since this is not the
case, the opportunity costs of capital must also be
considered in the discount rate. The discount rate used
under any NPV situation will ultimately effect the final
capital investment decision.
The NPV model is useful because it allows a manager to
view the costs of one investment relative to other
alternative investments. The project that allows the
largest NPV and the best capability, or capacity, is
generally the one to be considered. The NPV model can also
be applied to lease or buy decisions. In this case, the
alternative with the smallest present value for the cash
outflows (discounted cash flows) is considered the best.
B. NET PRESENT VALUE AND UNIFORM ANNUAL COST EXAMPLE
CALCULATION
The active RRF (COM-20) example calculation is discussed
here to describe how the NPV and uniform annual costs were
calculated. The spread sheet is set up in four basic
categories: investment (or acquisition cost), operating cash
flows (leasing income, or operating subsidies), maintenance
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and disinvestment. This example calculation was done at a
10 percent discount rate.
The cash flows for ship construction begin in year zero
and continue until year three, at the payment rate discussed
previously. These cash flows are discounted to give their
present value. At a 10 percent discount rate, the present
value of $200 million spent over four years at the
predetermined rate is $154.66 million.
In year four, the ship is leased to a commercial
shipping company. This continues until year 18 (for a total
of 15 years) when the ship is then placed in the RRF. To
determine the present value for those 15 year annual lease
payments, the present value factors for years four to 15 are
summed (5.7145) and then multiplied by the $5 million annual
lease payments. The present value of the lease income is
$28.57 million.
The same is done for the costs of maintaining the ship
in ROS in the RRF from years 19 to 43 (25 years) . The
present value factors for those years are summed and then
multiplied by the annual ROS costs ($3,742 million) and the
annual costs for the required merchant marine reserve
personnel ($101,200). These present values are $6,128
million and $165,730 respectively. This example shows that
deferring costs for maintaining ships in the RRF to the
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distant future (greater than 19 years) significantly reduces
the present value of those costs.
Finally, the ship is scrapped in year 44. The cash
inflow is $2 million, but after 44 years the present value
is only $30, 000.
The next step in the calculation is to sum the present
values for the cash inflows and outflows in each year, which
gives the NPV. In this example, the NPV is $131.85 million.
The last step in the calculation is to determine the uniform
annual cost. This is done by dividing the NPV by the sum of
the discount factors over the ship's useful life (44 years).
The uniform annual cost in this calculation is $12.15. This
cost is then divided by the square feet of cargo capacity
for the ship (240,000) to normalize the calculation in terms
of units. The final calculation is $0.0506 ($M/K-sq-ft)
.
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